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SUMMARY:

Timely

A three-judge district court struck down the

statutory retirement system for Mass. state police on the ground
that the 50-year-old mandatory retirement age lacked a rational
basis and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
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FACTS:

Murgia was a Lt.

Co~onel

in the state police

and was required to retire at age SO pursuant to Mass. Gen.
Laws ch.32, §26(3) which states that members of the state police:
[S]hall be retired by the state board of
retirement upon his attaining age fifty or
upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs.
Since under state law no male may enlist in the state police
after age 30, the mandatory retirement age is SO.

It is not

disputed that Murgia was in excellent physical condition, as
measured by annual medical examinations which were required
to be taken.
The USDC recognized that police work is arduous and that
there is a "general relationship between advancing age and
decreasing physical ability", but emphasized that "the relation
between chronological age and functional age varies greatly
from one individual to the next."

The court accepted the

State's argument that an arbitrary standard is necessary in
those situations where individual determination s are impractical
(e.g., voting, jury service, selective service age), but rejected
administrative convenience in the circumstances of this case -since each officer was being medically examined each year

any~va y .

The court turned to a different test of reasonableness: "is
there, for example, a greater risk at the higher age that the
test, or, more exactly, the prognosis based upon testing , will
be less reliable?"
Looking at the record, the USDC noted that, unlike Air Line
Pilots Ass 'n v. Quesada , 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), the re
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are no studies of any kind which were conducted to support
a conclusion that by age 50, in spite of medical testing, a
critical area had been reached.
of actual experience

Indeed, the only statistics

showed no greater incidence of non-injury

disability in the group age 45-49 than for the 40-44 age group.
The court therefore concluded that mandatory retirement at age

50 -- where individualized medical screening is not only available but already required -- lacked any factual basis.

The

court rejected out-of-hand two stock justifications for early
retirement: morale among young officers and the facilitation
of rapid promotion.

In its opinion published May 31, 1974,

the USDC declared the Massachusetts statutory retirement scheme
void and indicated that injunctive relief would be awarded
after further hearing.
On December 12, 1974, the court handed down a second
opinion in which it considered the measure of relief.

The

USDC enjoined the operation of the statute and ordered Hurgia
reinstated as a Lt. Colonel of state police.

The court refused

to appoint him to a particular job since it did "not propose to
organize

the State Police."

Under the authority of Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the court refused to award back pay
and attorney's fees.

Murgia argued that attorney's fees should

be awarded since they could be considered "incidents of the
hearing ... which attach to the regular jurisdiction" of the
court like court costs.

The court noted that attorney's fees

are awarded sometimes on a private attorney general theory, b1.1t
concluded:

•,

\

~
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Each of these objectives reflects independent
policy considerations unrelated to the enforcement of injunctions, and in no sense can be
termed "integral" to such relief.
The court noted that there were no special burdens on plaintiff
(e.g., not a class action) and denied counsel fees.

The USDC

did hold that the State was chargeable for regular court costs.

CONTENTIONS:

In No. 74-1044, the State argues that the

USDC erred and that the mandatory retirement statute does bear
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.

It

urges that:
The retirement statute ... has the positive
objective of promoting the physical capability
of the state police. Intersecting the lines
of increasing age and decreasing physical
capability at age fifty is a rational accomodation well within the legislative power
to make.
The State challenges the USDC's analogy of this case to Cleve-

(

land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), since a
fundamental right (procreation) was being infringed in that
case.

Further, the State argues that morale and promotion

o~portunities

are legitimate considerations and that steps may

be taken to avoid "staf gnatim of promotion and disincentive
to service." Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S.Ct. 672 (1975).
Murgia has filed a motion to affirm, which adheres to
the USDC's approach.

He emphasizes that a mandatory retirement

age of 50 is by nature different from retirement at more usual
ages (60-70) and does not fall "within the range where fairness
or a rational relation to a state purpose exists."

An amicus

brief has been filed by the State Police Association of Mass.
•

I

•

•

which, interestingly enough, supports the State s posltlon,

.

'

five

[M~Pe,~As.s~~, a..~+~ ~~l

not Murgia's.

In No. 74-1120, Murgia complains of the denial of attorney's
fees.

He argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the

awarding of such fees, see Sims v. Amos, 340 F.Supp. 691 (H.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972)(reapportionment case).
Murgia urges that the Court should note probable jurisdiction
if it grants cert in Jordan v. Gilligan, No. 74-403; Taylor v.
Perini, No. 74-506;

and other cases raising this claim.

Hurgia

argues that this case is a proper situation for awarding fees
since he comes within the private attorney general doctrine.
The State has filed a motion to affirm in which it argues
that attorney's fees were properly denied..

It points out that

the USDC indicated that it would not award fees as a matter of
discretion, even if the Eleventh Amendment argument failed,
since plaintiff had no special burdens.

DISCUSSION:

Especially in light of the Court's su1nmary

'1

affirmance of Weisbrod v. Lynn, No. 74-594 (February 24, 1975),
and earlier dismissal (DWSFQ) of Hcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415
U.S. 986 (1974)(Blaclunun, J., would have noted prob. juris.),
it appears that the Court should take this case up on the merits.
The USDC took a very "active" vie\v of the rational relationship

l

test, requiring more than mere surmise and possibility from the
State.

These "tests" under the Fourteenth Amendment are always

spongy.

It might be wise to wait for a few more lower court s

to consider the constitutiona l basis of age discrimina tion, but
on the other hand it would surely be confusing to have summary

'·'

····.
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affirmances going different directions.

A summary reversal

hardly seems appropriate, even if the Court desires to go that
way, since there is no obvious authority to hang the reversal
on.
Regarding the attorney's fees issue, this looks like another
to hold for Alyeska Pipeline.
There are motions to affirm.
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Chris Whitman

DATE:

December 8, 1975

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia
I would reverse.
Age is not a suspect classification.

Nor is the

expectation of continued employment here a fundamental right
(in fact there is no expectation at all since the retirement
age has been set at 50 for years).

Under these circumstances

the "rational relationship" test applies.

The three-judge

district court, applying that test, found no rational
relationship.

I disagree.

The district court's decision does not purport to hold
that a 50-year retirement line would in itself lack a rational
basis where, as here, the job is arduous and physically demanding,
requiring top physical condition.

It admits (and respondent

concedes) that the state's interest in a top-shape work force
is legitimate and that age is rationally related to declining
physical condition.

The district court's decision is based

instead on the fact that periodic individual physicials are
given to the policemen.

The argument goes:

Since the state

has detailed information on the physical well-being of each
policeman it has no

interest in employing a generalized

presumption that would eliminate some men that it knows are

2.
in good condition.
There are several problems with this analysis.

First,

there is no guarantee that the physicals are always sufficient
to detect declining physical strength.

Second, it is rational

for the state to establish a certain age beyond which decline
in physical condition below a minimum level of acceptability
becomes more likely, and to institute a supplementary series
of periodic exams to insure that no one falls dramatically
below that level of acceptability before reaching the cut-off
age.

This system not only insure a relatively fit force but

avoids the emotional upset and uncertainty that would be created
by a system that relied completely on individual examinations.
Third, state interests other than the maintenance of a strong
physicially strong force are served by the flat retirement
age.

,·

One of these, pointed out by

appellants, is that a fixed age facilitates the planning of
pension and retirement programs.

More important, a relatively

early retirement age allows for the constant infusion of young
personnel and for rapid promotions.

The morale value of such

a system - and the sense it provides of a young and innovative
force - can be a legitimate state goal.

The district court

discounted this interest because of the off-setting decline
in the morale of those older men who must retire.
think that it can be so easily dismissed.

I don't

The older men

have pensions and have the experience and training to go on
to other, less demanding, lines of work.

In any case, it

j.

is not irrational (though it may sound ruthless) for the state
to decide that the morale of the younger men is more significant
in shaping the direction of the department and that overall
efficiency is better served by quick promotion of the young
than by extended service by older men at the top of the heap.

Chris
s
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 28, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference

';,

,®u:pumt {!j:Oltrlllf t!rt ~tb .®ta.tts

-Mlpngflttt. ~. Qj:. 20~)!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

/

January 28, 1976

Re:

No . 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Bill:
I anticipate circulating a separate opinion concurring
only in the result in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.;§u.pumt ~on.rt of lqt ~~lt .:%$faits
~rurlfingian, ~. <lJ. 2!Tc?J!.~
CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

J anuary 28, 1976

No. 74-1044, Mass. Board v. Murgia
Dear Bill,
As I indicated to you orally, I contemplate writing a brief concurring opinion in this
case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

t
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CH A M BL R S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 30, 1976

· Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Bill:
Since I fear that I will not get my separate opinion
in the above case circulated for a couple of weeks, I thought
I would sketch for your benefit (?) w~at I have in mind
addr e ssing. I agree entirely with the result you reach,
and I also fully agree that this is a case .f or "minimum
scrutiny" in that it does not involve a "suspect classification" or "fundamental right". My difficulty, which is
probably less with your opinion than with the language from
other opinions which it quotes, is that it seems to state
quite a different and more expansive test for this kind of
review than was stated in Bill Douglas' opinion in
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 u.s. 483.
I assume that, being the skilled craftsman you are,
you have consciously opted for a standard of review which will
give the courts more l eeway in striking down state legislation
of this sqrt, or at least that you feel that. the Court has
opted for it on previous occasions. If I am wrong, and am
actually making a semantical mountain out of a molehill, let
me know and it may be that I will write something quite
different, or perhaps not write anything at all.

- 2 -

On page 8 of your draft, you said that the inquiry
is whether the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary,
and • • • rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
After citing cases, you say that "the substance of such
inquiry is essentially whether the classification is reasonably
related to a legitimate state objective." On page 10, you
say that our inquiry "ceases with a determination that the
age fifty classification rationally relates to the furtherance
of the state's announced objective."

I

Although one can argue about the meaning of each word,
it seems to me by the time that you require the rational
relationship to be to the state's "announced" objective,
a~d th~t you require the classificatiqn to have not
merely a r 'elation, but "a fair and substant.ial relation" ·
to the object, the courts are given much more authority
than I would have thought th~ Fourteenth Amendment
entitled them to in the area where concededly only "minimum
rutiny" applies. While it is difficult to articulate in
general terms, I think the test your opinion enunciates is
quite a different one than that of Williamson v. Lee Optical,
or the McGowan v. Maryland language that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside in any of any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S. 420, 426.
I presume there will always be differences among us
as to what sort of a classification demands "strict scrutiny",
and perhaps unresolved questions as to whethe~ there may be
an intermediate level of scrutiny between "strict" and
"rational basis", a sort of scrutiny that some say was applied
in the Chief's famous opinion in Reed v. Reed and in Lewis'
opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.
I think
what I will say in my separate opinion boils down to the idea
that once it is conceded that none of these factors are

- 3

I

/

involved, the standard ought to be simply stated and ought
to virtually foreclose judicial invalidation except in the
rare, rare case where the legislature has all but run
amok and acted in a patently arbitrary manner.
Sincerely,

~-

J

Mr. Justice Brennan

.

'

To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

Date: Feb. 2, 1976

Chris Whitman
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia -- No. 74-1044

-

I see difficulties in two paragraphs of Justice Brennan's
opinion.

My difficulties stem from my hesitancy concerning

the stress laid upon representation in the legislature as an
............

-----

~

indicia of a suspect classification

see the paragraph on pgs.

It may x be true that the Court can XHiaxxxxxxE and does

6-7.

relax its scrutiny as the legislative process responds to xxx
certain problems -- although I am not sure that that is a wise
~

'(~

approach.

But the fact that much legislation concerning

racial discrimination has been enacted does not make XR race
any less a "suspect classification•; in fact, the legislation
has been taken as an indication of the importance of closely
scrutinizing racial BXXEXXMXRX classifications that come before
(teenagers, children)
the EBHXX Court. And the fact that young people/are not well
represented in the legislature does not make classifications
~HxxaiRXRgxxs

turning on youth suspect.

Rather, the Court

seems to be concerned whether there has been a history of
and unacceptable
arbitrary/treatment
of a given group due to sterotypes that our
........

_

~

system will not tolerate (my rather hasty and gross overgeneralization).
After emphasizing the importance of iHgx representation
in the legislature in determining what is a suspect classification,
Justice Brennan then distinguishes sex from age on the basis
of such representation. (P. 9-10)

This indicates that sex

a "suspect classification" -- a result that we surely need

-2reach here -- and suggests that as women xx gain msxHxpx greater
representation in the legislature, discrimination on the basis
of sex will be

xx

is unnecessary.

less closely scrutinized.

This

There

case, like this one, turned on the question of whether the
classification was "arbitrary" or "rationally related to the
state objective."

In fact, Justice Brennan, on page 11,

aieei:Rg:w:is'Res ~ OQ iKRJiili.JIHtiB¥ e'ka&a luu;ii I
RKK~

applies the

Reed standard and finds that the classification here meets it.

A more minor point -- I was surprised that the opinion
handles the question of the impact of periodic exams so
cursorily, since that was the crux of the decision below.
I do think that the use of exams does not xR£ destroy the
rationality of the EHxx££x cut-off point (see my memo), but
I frankly just don't understand the point made in this
regard by x footnote 13, on page 11.

Chris

- 4-

{WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP), the Court went so far as to find that
one of the Government interests advanced in support of the classification involved there was illegitimate, after first having held that
[u]nder traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification is rationally related
to a le~itimate government interest ... JQ., at 533. The requirement
was sim1larly recognized in Potter's Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78, 84 {PS, WEB, BRW, HAB):
If the goals sought are leg1timate and
classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of
those goals, then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... Likewise, in
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 {LFP, WEB, WJB, PS, BRW, HAB,
WHR), we held that the Court "[inquires] only whether the chall~nged
distinction rationally furthers some legitimate articulated purpose ...
11

11

A legitimate interest was also required in San Antonio Inde endent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 55 LFP, WEB, PS, HAB, WHR),
and was required as recently as your Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 772, 777,
where you said that Congress may not invidiously d1scriminate . . . on
the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate
legislative goal, .. and that the classification must solve a problem
which the Government legitimatel.Y desired to avoid ... Finally, Potter's
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (PS, WEB, BRW, HAB, LFP, WHR), and
Jiminez v. Weinberger, supra, at 636, took care to emphasize that state
interests i nvolved were 11 legitimate ...
11

11

In sum, I think equal protection analysis in our modern cases, where
no Suspect classification .. or fundamental right .. is involved, has adhered since 1920 when Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia was decided, to the
test that a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and reasonable relation
to [a legitimate] object of the legislation . . . .
11

11

11

11

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN. JR.

February 9, 1976

RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board, etc. v. Murgia
Dear Bi 11:
Your comments on my proposed Murgia op1n1on, and Potter's concurring opinion in the case suggest, I think, that in the absence of a
"suspect classification" or involvement of a "fundamental right", the
applicable test is necessarily one of "minimum scrutiny" as defined
in Wi 11 iamson v. Lee Optical and McGowan v. Maryland: · "a statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." In my view, our QEinions have develo~ed a more flexible rule, and Murgia reflects, I suggest, not a
rewr1ting of tne law, but the more flexible test that has evolved.
Absent the need for strict scrutiny, have we not employed tests in
a variety of cases, making it clear that minimum scrutiny in the Lee
Optical definition is not always the result when suspect classes and
fundamental rights are absent? See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498; Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361; James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438; Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71. The proposed Murgia opinion suiTITlarizes the fJexi!Ue
~t of these and all our cases where strict scrutiny has not been ap;:, . -: 2,j; for it l eaves the determina tion of the requisite r el ations hip
between means and end to the nature of each case presented. In vi ew
of the political clout of the aged, only a rational relation between
the classification and the State's purpose was required to sustain
the classification in Murgia. The test as applied to the age 50
classifi cation, therefore, doesn't differ from that employed in other
cases of minimum scrutiny.
')

I do not think the Murgia opinion opts for a standard of review
which will give the courts more leeway in striking down state legislation than we have already given them. After all, Murgia sustains

II
VJ

- 2 -

a classification based on a criterion (age) in many respects quite
akin to sex. If Murgia is not a fair treatment of our equal protection analysis as our cases have evolved it, w~2re left with only
the rigid two-tier approach which I had thought all of us found unacceptable. If only either mere rationality or strict scrutiny are
the available tests, then we will have to acknowledge we can no
longer defend the results of Jiminez, James, Weber, Eisenstadt and
Reed. Also, since the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions seems
to have been permanently interred, we should, as well, be prepared
to confess we were wrong in the results we reached in Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632; USDA v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508;
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 635.

~

The following cases, I think, support my conviction that not only is
Murgia no departure from prior law, but that the line-up in each of them
is cogent evidence that eight of us (John was not involved in any way)
have been party to opinions expressing that general view. Potter objects
to describing the inquiry as Whether the classification is reasonably
related to a 1egitimate state objective, .. and you express concern with
describing the inquiry as whether the classification is .. reasonable, not
arbitrary and . . . rests upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation... Yet fair
and substantial .. relation between classification and purpose is the test
stated in the following cases: Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (HAB,
WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM, LFP); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374
(WJB, unanimous); Kahn v. Shevin, 4l6 U.S. 351, 355 (WOO, WEB, PS, HAB,
LFP, WHR); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (WJB, WOO, PS, TM);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP,WHR);
RQY5ter GUanO Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415. Similarly, Weber v.
Aetna Casualty &Surety Co., supra (LFP, WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM},
stated that, at a minimum, equal protection requires a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, and recognized a range of inquiry
between that minimum and strict scrutiny by further observing that a
....... ,,. .. c.J. c:;cr t ·' Yly" wc.s required when sensitive rights were approached.
Aaalti~nally, weoer he~a tnat the classification involved bore no
Significant relationship to the State's purposes and that the classification was illogical and unjust... Id., at 175. Finally, in Jiminez
v. Weinberger, supra, at 636 (WEB, WOD~WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP), we
invalidated the classification challenged there as not .. reasonably related" to the Government's interest.
11

11

11

11

I

11

11

11

To be sure, all these~cases fa!l into the twiliaht zone of etu}l
prQtection; they are, nevertheTeS$7 part of the warp and woof o equal
proteCtion law and must be dealt with if there's any disposition among

1

"'·

I

I
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us to revise the contours of the appropriate inquiry where strict
scrutiny is inappropriate. Indeed, even McGowan and its progeny
support inquiries not really different from Murgia's. In McGowan,
366 U.S., at 428, the Court felt it appropriate to inquire into
"reasonableness" and to conclude that there was "no indication of
the unreasonab l eness .. of, but rather a .. reasonable basis .. for, the
classificati ons involved there. Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 {PS, WEB, BRW, Black, Harlan), a majority of us held
that "in the area of economics and social welfare," a classification
does not offend the Constitution if it has ' some reasonable basis."
Finally, as recently as Weinber er v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777
(WHR, WEB, PS, BRW, HAB, LFP , a majority of us held that classifications would be upheld SO long as they comport with the standards
of legislative reasonableness enunciated in cases like Dandridge v.
Williams and Richardson v. Belcher ... If it was permissible for
"standards of legislative reasonableness .. in Salfi to include the
rationality of Dandridge and Belcher, how is Murgia's analysis different?
11

11

You also express concern with Murgia's statement that our inquiry
ceases with a determi nation that the age fifty classification
rationa l ly relates to the state's announced objective", questioning
particularly whether this means that the state's purpose must be not
only legitimate but tha t it must be articulated. I suspect you and
I might answer t hat question di f f erently but Murgia doesn't attempt
to answer it. Rather the opinion merely observes that the state has
articulated a purpose here, not that it was required to do so. By
contrast, it is debatable whether the New Orleans City Council articulated a purpose for the "grandfather .. clause in the ordinance involved
in Dukes, and it may be that we should use that case as the vehicle
for deciding the issue.
11

On the question of legitimate s·tate purpose, of particular concern to Potter, I can only say that our prior equal protection decisions )virtually w·i·''1'Jut excepti on, su pport tt.c requi rement of at
I east a ·1 egi timate state i m:erest. The tests t o determine t he
validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have
been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that
a statutory classifi cation bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose ... Weber v. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co., supra, at
172. The essential i nquiry in all the . • . cases is . . . inevitably
a dual one: What legitimate state· interest does the classification
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger? .. .!.Q_., at 173. Indeed, in USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
11

11

,

11

11
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No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment.
Although I completely agree with the result reached by the
Court in this case, and with parts of its analysis in reaching that
result, I have sufficient reservations about other parts that I concur only in the judgment.

I think the test announced by the Court

represents a significant departure from its previous equal protection decisions, and is one which could portend mischief throughout
state and federal judicial systems.
It is important to place the Court's analysis in perspective.

The Court convincingly demonstrates, and I entirely agree, that
there is at issue here neither any fundamental right, slip op. at
5-6, nor any classification directed towards a "suspect class, " Id. ,

*I
at 6-7.

I therefore agree with the Court that there is nothing in

I do not, however, agree with the intimations in the Court's
proposed opinion that identification of such classes is somehow derived from judicial perceptions of their effectiveness in the political
arena. Slip op. at 9-10. But as no one suggests that any such a
"class" is implicated here, I leave my misgivings about such suggestions for some more appropriate occasion,
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this case justifying the use of what it describes as "strict scrutiny"
to review the enactment of the. Massachusetts legislature.
Nor is there anything in this case, so far as I can determine,
that would suggest the use of any so-called "intermediate level of
scrutiny.'' Whatever may be the merits of such a standard of constitutional inquiry in some cases, there is no suggestion that any
such hybrid test is called for here.
This case, then, is agreed by all to be governed by the least
exacting standard of judicial review.
formulation of that standard.

My difficulty is with the Court's

It states, slip op., at 8, that the

"inquiry appropriate" here is "whether the classification is

1

reason-

able, not arbitrary, and • • • rest[s] upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. '"
It immediately thereafter paraphrases this quotation to frame the
inquiry as "essentially whether the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate objective."
When this formulation is compared with what the Court has
previously approved as the test of "minimum rationality", there
appear to be several significant differences.

While to some these

may seem to be a matter of semantics, I am troubled lest these
signal, however inadvertently, a retreat from the hard-won battle

7
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for judicial deference to legislative

e~actment

in this field of

economic and social regulation.
I have always understood the standard of review appropriat e
under the Equal Protection Clause to be that set out in McGowan v .
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

In summarizing the standards un der

which equal protection challenges are examined by the Court, Mr.
Chief Justice Warren recognized that although no precise formula
had been developed
"the Court has held that the F ·ourteenth Amendment
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S., at 425-426
(citations omitted).
When this formulation is compared to that advanced by the Court today,
I become doubtful that the two are intended to be identical; more importantly, I doubt they will be understood as identical by those who
read and interpret our opinions.
I am not sure that there is any meaningful difference between
a "fair" relation to the State's objective and a "reasonable" one, both
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of which phrases are used in the Court's opinion.

And I could agree

that either seems to echo McGowan's recognition, with which I fully
agree, that a classification which is "wholly irrelevant" to that objective contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment.

I am not so sure of the

result, however, when the word "substantial" is added to the tes t , as
the Court does here.

"Substantial," for me at least, implies a require-

ment having some additional teeth in it beyond that of mere rationality,
a situation which I think is strenuously to be avoided if we are to remain
true to McGowan and the history of constitutional adjudication which it
summarizes.

I think it would be downright pernicious if we were to

give the impression that in a case challenging a state statute where
everyone agrees that the minimum standard of constitutional review is
appropriate, courts are to apply their own view of whether the statute
"substantially" promotes the State's interests; striking down the statute

if they disagree with the State's assessment of the need for its statute.
The next portion of the Court's test which gives me pause is its
repeated reference to the necessity of there being a "legitimate state
interest" towards the achievement of which the statute in question must
be either "reasonably" or "fairly and substantially" related.
Certainly more than one of our cases has described the standard
in question in terms of whether the statutory scheme "rationally furthers
some legitimate, articulated state purpose .

·~ '

"

See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17.

If the phrase

"legitimate state interest" is merely a shorthand for an interest
within the scope of the State's "police power", and it is understood
that this reserved power is bounded only by constitutional guarant ees,
the phrase is unexceptionable.

But if the Court means that entir ely

apart from a state statute's trenching upon constitutional guarantees,
and entirely apart from such a statute's being directed at a "suspect
class", the Court must determine by some apparently unknown calculus
whether the State's goal in enacting the statute is "legitimate", I disagree and do not read our prior decisions using such phrasing to
support such a result.

Rodriquez, for example, cited with approval

the Court likewise stated:
"It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus,
the key to discovering whether education is
'fundamental' is not to be found in comparison
with the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor
is it to be found by weighing whether education
is as important as the right to travel. Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. " 411 U.S. , at
33-34.
I joined the Court's opinion in Rodriquez, an opinion which
expressly refused to expand the notion of "rights" requiring "strict

_.

- 6 scrutiny" beyond interests derived from the Constitution itself.
'

Surely that decision was not

ir:~:tended

to embrace the identical twin

of the expansive doctrine urged by the appellees in that case by
according substantive constitutional meaning to the word ''legitimate. "
Yet as I read the Court's proposed opinion in this case, what
was in Rodriquez merely a recognition that the State was presumed
to act constitutionally has become a test having its own independent
significance.

The opinion suggests, slip op. pp. 8-9, that a State

must demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction the "legitimacy" of its
interest before the Court need even consider whether the means
chosen by the state is "reasonably related" to that interest.

While

understood in one way, this approach may be valid, it seems to me
to run the risk of confusing two concepts which are better kept
separate.
No one doubts, for example, that a state statute which has as
its purpose discrimination against blacks is violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

It might be said that the State's interest in such legisla-

tion is simply not "legitimate" in constitutional terms.

If such a

violation of the Constitution is demonstrated, that ends the matter and
there is no occasion to consider whether the means which it chose to
pursue that goal are either rationally related or wholly irrelevant to it.
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But in a case such as ours, where it is conceded that no
"suspect classification" is involved, and no substantive constitutional right infringed, I fear that the Court's treatment of the phrase
"legitimate state interest" may confuse.

Even if we do not do so,

other courts may attempt to give content to each word and phrase
of the test.
Insofar as those courts, or for that matter, this Court, write
opinions

fully disclosing their analysis and

justifying the results

they reach, any errors in interpretation of what is a "legitimate state
interest" will be subject to review either by higher courts, or in the
case of this Court to the customary elucidations between majority
and minority opinions in this Court.

But even if the adjective "legitimate"

is not intended to have any added constitutional content or to possess
independent force, I fear it may nonetheless have a mischievous
tendency to obscure the decisional process in equal protection cases.

If courts are obligated to hypothesize purposes which the legislature
may have had in mind, as I believe McDonald and McGowan instruct,
there may well be a tendency to shy away from advancing or carefully
examining a purpose which the Court may upon casual reflection think
is somewhat dubious, on the unstated assumption that such a purpose
is not ''legitimate".

There will likewise be the same tendency on the

part of advocates defending statutes chaHenged on equal protection

..

•

'

',
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grounds.

The result in such cases will not be a square holding,

supported by principled reasoning, that particular state purposes
are not legitimate.

It will instead be an almost subconscious or

subliminal refusal to hypothesize purposes thought "dubious", even
though upon more mature examination such justifications for a
statute would be found to be entirely "legitimate".

The real decision-

making will then be reflected, not in the written opinion of the Court,
but in an often casual and intuitive rejection without discussion of
some possible purpose, which may indeed have been the real purpose
of the legislature, on the incorrect assumption that such purpose was
not "legitimate" and therefore need not be hypothesized or discussed
in the opinion.
This problem is greatly compounded in my view, by the portion
of the Court's standard of review which seems to me to have the least
support in our cases and to be the farthest from my understanding of
the proper application of the Equal Protection Clause,

At at least

two points it is asserted that the question is whether the Massachusetts
statute is satisfactorily related "to the State's announced purpose."
Slip op. at 9, see id. at 10.
ment,

I fail to see the source of this require-

As can be seen from the quote from McGowan set out earlier,

the scope of review only fifteen years ago was understood to require
affirmance of a state legislative classification "if any state of facts

•,

'
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reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

11

This same view of the

operation of the Equal Protection Clause was reiterated more expansively by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in McDonald v. Board of
Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969):
"Legislatures are presumed to have acted
constitutionally even if source materials
normally resorted to for ascertaining their
grounds for action are otherwise silent, and
their statutory classifications will be set
aside only if no grounds can be conceived to
justify them. 11 (citing McGowan, et al. ) .
I have always thought the restrictions placed upon reviewing courts
by our decisions and er:nbodied in two excerpts above were the product
not only of very salutary recognition of the extremely serious business
of invalidating state statutes under the Constitution, but also had a
great deal to do with the relationships between courts and legislatures
in general, and federal courts and state legislatures in particular.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which requires
the States to set out a

11

purpos e 11 or

11

obj ective 11 of any legislation, and

in my experience few do so, at least as a matter of course.

Like the

Congress, some state legislatures do seem to have begun the practice
of occasionally appending preambles to their bills which purport to
announce the reasons why the bill was enacted and the
it was hoped to cure.

11

evils 11 which

But this is still very much the exception rather

than the rule, and most reviewing courts have nothing to guide them

.-
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as to the ''purpose" of a challenged statute other than the words of
the statute its elf.

It is partly for this reason, as I have understood

it, that the clear mandate of this Court has consistently been that
reviewing judges are to assiduously apply themselves to hypothesizing
a statutory purpose consistent with both the statute's language and
with the Constitution.

It is only if they cannot do so --only "if [no]

set of facts can be conceived to justify [the statute]" --that it is
permissible for them to interfere with the expressed will of the
electorate by invalidating the statute.
Instead of this requirement, the Court's opinion seems to
suggest that courts need look only to the State's announced "purpose"
in evaluating the rationality of a challenged statute.

But how can this

be accomplished if the legislature has been "silent" regarding its
purpose, i. e. it has enacted only the words of the statute leaving it to
others to divine its purpose from those words?
The only other source of an "announced purpose" for legislation challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is the pres entation
made in court by the advocate upon whom is thrust the responsibility
of defending the constitutionality of such legislation,

Legislation

challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have been enacted by a State, by a county, or by one of
countless varieties of municipal corporations throughout the country.

:-

'.

'.
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:
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Even in this Court, where one might expect to find only the most
highly skilled attorneys practic::ing, the quality of advocacy in defense
of enactments challenged on grounds of equal protection varies from
the able and well prepared to the far less able and totally unprepared.
And if this is true here, it must occur with even greater frequency
in the lower courts.

I am thus extremely chary of entrusting the

constitutional validity of a state legislative enactment entirely to the
quality of those who may be litigating on the State's behalf.

Certainly

those advocates may add substantially to a court's understanding of
the problem and its perception of what is at stake from the State's
point of view.

But if they fail to do so, I cannot believe that it neces-

sarily follows that the State's otherwise valid legislative classification
must be declared unconstitutional.

It seems to me the height of

irresponsibility to permit a court to declare invalid a state statute
because it does not seem relevant to the "purpose" discovered by the
lawyer representing the state before it, although the court could with
very little effort ascertain another purpose embodied in the legislation
which fully supports its constitutionality.
The quotation around which the Court weaves much of its thesis
of judicial review in this case is from Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, an opinion of two Terms ago which I readily joined.

But I did

not understand that opinion to lay down any restriction of the State to

,.
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some "announced purpose", contrary to the language in McDonald
quoted supra at 3.

In Johnson, the Court simply said, in its discus-

sion of legislative purpose:
"Unlike many state and federal statutes that
come before us, Congress in this statute has
responsibly revealed its express legislative
objectives in § 1651 of the Act and no other
objective is claimed . • • • 11 415 U.S. 361,
376.
Nor did I think at that time that the inclusion in Johnson of the
11

fair and substantial relation•• language from Royster Guano Co. v.

Virginht, 25 3 U.S. 412 ( 1920), was intended as a subtle and wholly
unannounced repudiation of McGowan.
Since the Court today, however, seems to ascribe so much
significance to the particular manner in which the

11

test 11 was stated

in Johnson, I cannot subscribe to any intimation in today• s opinion
that the settled rules of McDonald and McGowan have been or should
be abandoned.

As noted earlier the quotation in Johnson is from Royster
Guano, 253 U.S., at 415, as quoted in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,

7.6 (1971).

Reed, in turn, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

406 U.S. 164 ( 1972), are repeatedly cited by the Court to support its
discussion of the standard of constitutional review.

Presumably then

these decisions are indicative of what is intended by the language
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"fair and substantial relationship" in the instant application of that
phrase.

My reading of those c.ases convinces me that none embodies

a test of constitutional review which is appropriate on the facts n ow
before us.
In Royster Guano the Court struck down a state statute whi ch
taxed all income of local corporations doing business within the St ate,
whether derived from outside the State or from within it, while
exempting entirely any income derived from outside the State by local
corporations which did no business within the State.

Stating that it

could conceive of no justification for thus exempting the out-of- state
income of one of these two classes of corporations, the Court held
that it was "obvious that the ground of difference upon which the discrimination is rested has no fair or substantial relation to the proper
object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.

11

253 U.S., at 416.

Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, dissented.

In that

opinion Justice Brandeis persuasively demonstrates a perfectly rational
explanation for the choice made by the Virginia legislature, and in
doing so reveals Royster Guano for what it is -- an artifact from an
era where unrestrained judicial interference with legislative decisionmaking was the rule, rather than the exception.

I had thought that era

well behind us, repudiated by a line of decisions in this Court culminating in McGowan.

By its use of the language from Royster Guano in a
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case where the least rigorous test of constitutional review is said to
be applied I fear the Court's OJ?inion portends the resurrection of an
approach from days gone by.

348

u.s.

See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,

483, 488 (1955).

Reed seems to me similarly inapposite to this case.

There

the Court, relying on the Royster Guano formulation of the standard
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause, struck down an Idaho stat ute
which gave a preference to men over women in the selection of an
administrator of a decedent's estate.

In doing so, the Court rejected

what four members who joined the decision were later to characterize
as an "apparently rational explanation of the [Idaho] statutory scheme."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 6 77, 683 ( 1973) (opinion of Brennan,

J. ).

The apparent reason for doing so, at least in the view of that

plurality, was the fact that the classification in Reed was "sex-based,"
a factor thought to justify more rigorous judicial scrutiny.

But as

discussed earlier, everyone agrees that in this case there is nothing
to call for such inquiry.

The Court seems to recognize precisely this

difference between Reed and the instant case in its discussion on pp.
and I am somewhat at a loss as to why it goes on to
repeatedly cite Reed, and thereby to concomitantly rely upon Royster
Guano, for the test to be applied herein.

'·

·.
..

'
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The problem is compound e d by the Court's citation of Weber.
There the Court invalidated a Louisiana workmen's compensation
1

i

scheme which denied equal recovery to dependent unacknowledged
illegitima tes.

In its opinion the Court articulated a test somewhat

more in keeping with my understanding of minimal judicial review.
But its result has been generally understood to be derived from th e
Court's concern that illegitimates were deserving of some extra
measure of judicial protection.

See,

~·

, Wilkinson, The Supr e me

....--

Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945, 991 (1975), Note, Illegitimacy
andEqualProtection, 49N.Y.U. L. Rev. 479,484-489 (1974), Note,
Illegitimate Children and Constitutional Review, 1 Pepperdine L. Rev.
266, 279 (1974).

And the Court today so characterizes the rationale

of Weber, slip at 10.
of appellee Murgia.

In doing so it also distinguishes the situation
To my mind it follows from this distinction, with

which I fully agree, that the judicial scrutiny afforded the statute
discriminating against illegitimates in Weber is inappropriate here.
I am at a loss to understand how the Court can conclude otherwise.
We read to little purpose the history of this Court's half
century of adjudication ending in 1940 if we do not view with the
gravest apprehension any broadening of the extent of judicial oversight in cases where concededly no more than minimum scrutiny is

•'
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required.

The fact that the Court's proposed opinion concludes by

sustaining the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law in question
in this case does not dininish the cause for apprehension.

As a

supremely knowledgeable commentator said of the "old Court":
" • • . It approved or disapproved each law,
grudgingly giving consent to any departure
from laissez faire, or to any serious interference with the power of property and
employers. I do not mean to say that it
never did give consent • . . but this only
emphasizes the fact that the Court, and not
the legislature, became the final judge of
what might be law • . • ". Robert H. Jackson,
"The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy", p. 70.
I cannot believe that the Court should wish to retreat, either
consciously or inadvertently, a single step back towards doctrines
which were once the law of this Court, but which have been so long
discredited that it can now fairly be said that the judgment of history
is solidly against them.

·.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia
Dear Bill:
I agree with the result and most of your analysis in
the opinion you have circulated for the Court.
My difficulty relates to the comparison between "agebased classifications'' and "sex-based classifications",
addressed most specifically in the paragraph beginning on
page 9. Although you conclude that older people as a group
have not been "the subject of conspicuous discrimination"
to the same extent as women, I would prefer not to make this
comparison. As you will recall, I do not agree that the
feminine sex is a "suspect class" for purposes of equal
protection analysis, and doubt that I could be persuaded
otherwise.
I do not think your op~n~on would be weakened if all
of the paragraph mentioned were deleted except for the two
sentences that follow the citation of Weber. If, however,
you prefer to leave this in the opinion, I will write a
brief concurrence.
I may add that I am not entirely happy with "two-tier"
equal protection. In view of prior precedents, I followed
it in my opinions for the Court in Rodriguez and Griffiths
(among others). I fully endorse the concept of "str~ct
scrutiny" in certain circumstances (e.g., where race
discrimination or First Amendment rights are involved),
and this level of care may be appropriate whenever any
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is at issue.
But I shy away from the "compelling state interest" test,
as this usually prejudges an issue.

- 2 As commentators and other federal judges have pointed
out, the Court has spoken with "many voices" on equal
protection analysis. I therefore would view with an open
mind any broad reconsideration of a Court position.
But absent this ambitious undertaking, I am willing
to join your opinion subject to the change above suggested.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Rxsm Date: Feb. 12, 1976

Chris
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia

These are my initial reactions to the WJB-WHR correspondence.
I will take some more time to think the problems through, and
may change my views, but I thought you might like a quick
reaction.

I do not see any reason (other than those we have

already discussed)

x why you should not joing WJB's opinion.

WHR makes three points:
(1)

He takes issue with the requirement that the classification

have a "substantial" relation to the object of the legislation.
It is my understanding that this is no departure from previous
opinions.

WJB correctly points out that it has been frequenEtly

used -- XREXHHiHg indeed, in some opinions in which you have
concurred, such as Stanton, Johnson, Kahn.
mean nothing more than

~RBHKx:ix

"Substantial" need

"not frivolous or arbitrary,"

an interpretation wk:iEk which would give even WHR no pause.
Rxaxxx«HHxkHxx~xRsxpH

(Incidentally, it is a term used by Prof.
model
Gunther in his formulation of the/test.)
{t:i.,W/, ,.pu.ru~..~nt.d..~, Ps)

(2)

WHR fears that the reference to a "legitimate state
.1\

.

interest" imparts too much substantive

H

content into the court's

evaluation of the goal sought to be furthered by the state.
think that this is just semantici.

I

I see nothing in WJB's opinion

that indicates he means anything more than that the state interest
be"legitimate"i:Hxxka:xx:ixxxxiixxixkx in the sense that it falls
within the state's police power and violates no counstitutional
bounds.

Again, it is language frequently used in past opinions.

2.

(3)

I

WHR takes issue with Wil WJB's reference to an "articulated"

state purpose.
is correct.

He sees this as a departure from McGowan and he

WJB responds that he is merely saying that in this

case there is a rational xeix~ relationship to an articulated
state purpose, xxkxex rather than that there must be an articulated
state purpose in every case.

But WJB's formulation of the

test ~§JHH'KXiBRxx:exkexaR:s:xexeti ("question" to be answered) on
{

pages 9 and 10

d~Smake "articulation" part of the test.

"

you agree with WJB (an~Gunther
should be "articulated," however,

Since

.tha~erest

here is no reason for you

to reconsider your decision to join on this kxxe basis.

Addendum -- I have changed my mind regarding WJB's response to
WHR's criticism of his KK reference to the xxxxe:s: state's
"announced purpose." WJB responded that he was not making
a requirement that the purpose be "announced" part of the
test.
(If he were, you may want to ask him to change it
to "announced or readily discernable,"x as you note above,
in order to ensure that the legislature itself is not
always required to be absolutely explicit). Rather, WJB
says, he is merely x~ referring to the fact thatl in this
case there is an announced purpose and our inquiry ends
when we determine that the classification is rationally
related to that purpose -- leaving open the question whether
the court would look further for another (readily discernible
or EBREHixakie invented by the court) urpos if there were
no such rational relationship. At first
thought that
~XH WJB was being disingenuous in denying that he included
"announced purpose" as part of his test. But in context
he is merely making a factual reference. First; ~ he
says-(on pg. 8) that the legislature here has clearly
identified a purpose. Then he says we ask whether there
is a rational relationship to that announced purpose.
The whole thing is not as clear as it should be, perha~s.
But I do not think the opinion requires that the state s
purpose be clearly xxgiEH articulated by the legislature
~x:s:x:e~~:exea;x:s:x~x~xxkkex; (rather than, say, BHXEBH by
counsel in argument) in all future cases. xx Nor does
it even re guire that the purpose be •announced '' at all .
i n :Ettf!tt'!'e eas8s.
WJB may be correct in saying that
this battle, if it is to be fought, should be fought in
Dukes.
Chris

~u:prttttt

<!Jou:rt of tfrt ~ttittb ;%tafu

1Jaafringhtn, ~.

<!f.

2.0,?J!.~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JU ST IC E WM . .J . BREN NAN . .JR .

February 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
Bill Rehnquist and I have been exchanging views about the equal
protection test to be applied where the classification is neither
11
Suspect 11 nor one involving a .. fundamental right ... The Murgia opinion
relies upon language first used some fifty-six years ago in Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, namely, whether the classification is .. reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rests upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation ...
Bill wrote me a letter dated January 30 expressing his initial
concern about the approach taken in my Murgia opinion. A copy of
that letter is enclosed. I answered with the letter of February 9
addressed to him, a copy of which I also enclose. Bill has expanded his original letter into a memorandum to the conference dated
February 11, also enclosed.
Potter has also circulated a concurring opinion in the case in
which he says that he cannot subscribe to the view that the inquiry
is 11 Whether the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
state objective...
·
It seems to me that Bill and Potter's views are at odds with
statements in ·a number of equal protection cases cited in my memorandum and decided over the past half century.
By agreement between Bill and me these exchanges are circulated
·with the thought that they might aid the Conference in coming to
rest in this case. ·
W.J.B. Jr.

~

j;u:puntt <!Jttttrl of tqt 'Jl:hrifth ;%±attg
JfuJringLm. ~. <!J. 2o~JI.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 12, 1976

74-1044 - Mass. Bd. v. Murgia
Dear Bill,
I have read with interest the copies of the letters exchanged between you and Bill Rehnquist and Bill's memorandum
to the Conference, all enclosed with your memorandum to the
Conference of this date. As you know, I am in substantial
agreement with Bill Rehnquist' s views.
There would be no point in my trying to deal in specific detail with the cases you cite and discuss in your thorough
letter of February 9 to Bill. I cannot, however, allow one of
the statements in that letter to go unchallenged. Specifically,
I do not in the least believe "we were wrong in the results we
reached" in LaFleur, Vlandis, etc. It was precisely because
I thought the state laws in those cases should not and could not
be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause that I wrote
or joined opinions dealing with them under the Due Process
Clause. I do not at all think "we were wrong" in those cases,
but firmly believe we would have been "wrong" if we had
invalidated the state laws there involved under the Equal Protection Clause.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

Ofcurl of tlft ~"':1.-i±,tb- ~ta.h-s
'J! as Jringhtn. 19. QJ. 2!1~'1-~

S' :.tprtntt

CHAMBERS OF

j

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

March 30, 1976

Re:

74-1044 - Mas sachusetts Board v. Murgia

Dear Bill:
I have reviewed the commentaries on your proposed
draft in this case and I think we now need to "count heads. 11
In general, you can add "my head" to the position of
Chief Justice Warren, as expressed in McGowan v. Maryland.
I share the view that shrinks from any return to the substantive
due process approach, which puts me near Bill Rehnquist
but not entirely with him.
If you think this indicates a reassignment, as you
intimated to me on the Bench, I will proceed. Perhaps at
Conference this week we can clarify.

l:~~·~

~

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

,jttpTmu <!Iourt of tq~ ~~ ~tales
JTaslp:ttghttt. ~. <!I· 2ll.;T'!-~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 14, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Bill:
I, for one, appreciate your efforts, as well as
Lewis', to produce something that five of us could agree
upon. You~ revision accompanying your April 14 letter I
c~uld groh aoly j oi n, although I would much prefer a
-s omewh at more re l axed standard with respect to identifying the state interest or purpose where it is not
expressed in or plainly obvious from the statute itself.
I would give substantial weight--perhaps more than Lewis
would--to the representations of those who enforce a
statute as to the purposes the legislation serves. Your
identification and acceptance of the ultimate aim of the
ordinance in Dukes seems to me quite proper even though
the provision itself appears impenetrable on its face.

l

Again, thanks for all the effort.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell

.ju:putttt <!tttttri of tlft ~h .jtattg
11Jag£rin:ghtn. ~. <It· 2llgiJ!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTI CE WM . J . BRE NN AN . JR .

April 14, 1976

RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
Dear Lewis:
I've cribbed unashamedly from your circulation and the attached
represents my end product. But I strongly feel that the opinion
should be in your name and not in mine. This is not only because
much of the attached is in your words it's also because, quite frankly, our joint hope of a Court agreement on an equal protection
standard in this area has a better chance of realization if you rather
than I author the opinion.
I am sending this rather than bringing it to you with the
thought you might want to ponder it before we sit down to talk
about it.
I am sending a copy to Byron to keep him abreast of what's
happening since he's the only one who joined my circulation.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: Mr. Justice White

To:

Date:

Justice Powell

April 15, 1976

Chris Whitman

From:

No. 74-1044

Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia

I have made some changes along the lines suggested by
Justice White on page 12.

The only drawback I can see with

making this modification is that allowing post-enactment
interprextations by administrative bodies does not serve
the purposes described in the paragraph on pgs. 12 and 13 as
neatly as
do.

~XHHXBX

interpretations contemporaneous with enactment

That is, x£ one of the

~KX

reasons an articulated purpose

is required is to ensure that the democratic processes are
properly
operating/during the enactment of the statute.
A post-enactment
interpretation does not provide the same guarantee that the
iegxi le§islature's decision has received a public airing.

The other reason why an articulated purpose is required -- to
ensure that the judiciary has conducted a genuine inquiry -is served even if the x interpretation is made after enactment.
I suppose you could argue that the legislature has k made its
purpose sufficiently clear by delegating certain authority
to an administrative body that
limits.

B~exaxxH

operates within defined

Anyway, I wouldn't add this unless it is necessary

to get Justice White's agreement.
I read through the draft for possible problems and found
nothing major.

Reed v. Reed is cited XEH twice (pgs. 5 and 14)

as an example of the "mere rationality" test
think we should avoid.

something I

And some of the text (especially where

the two drafts have been spliced together, such as on pg. 9)

-2is a little too choppy for my taste.

I also don't think

the long quote in n. 14 a on pg. 13 fits
On page 12, the

l!ll!'H

xx

in at that place.

opinion:s says "we need not decide whether

a clearly identifiable purpose is always required."

Thatx

seems a little coy,gxXHR since the rest of the paragraph
goes on to say that it is indeed required, but the gxx problem
is not a major one.
I would add one thing that I should have put into my
original draft.
~R

In the discussion of suspect classifications

(ppg. 8-9) I xE:wlB would maBH make it clear that "special

disabilities" does not refer to biological disabilities (e.g.,
mental illness) but to societally imposed disabilities that
do not accurately reflect the real capacities of the persons
involved.
Chris

S&A

Y3rd :t>:RAF'r

~

t&e~·4.,wl

~.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF8
No. 74-1044

Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District of MaBsachusetts.
v.
Robert D. Murgia.
[February -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, memorandum.
This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uniformed State Police Officer 11 shall be retired ... upon his
11ttaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
"WheneveF the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof.. ..
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for t·he first time as an officer of
·t he division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides :
~' (a) ... Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter

74-1044-MEMO
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two .. . who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer .. . who has performed service . .. for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U . S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La.
1975) ; W eisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976) ; Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670- 671 (1974 ).
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to constituate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.

74--1044-MEMO
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
annually pass a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health rendered him still capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
· associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
. to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see San Antonio Independent School District v.
,Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v, Thomp$on,
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394 U. S. 618 (1969), for it determined that the age
classification established by the Massachusetts statutory
scheme could not in any event withstand a test of
rationality, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Since
there had been no showing that reaching age 50 forecast
"imminent change" in an officer's physical condition,
the District Court held that compulsory retirement at
age 50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter.mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.

I
We need (£_my bi iif!rstaW our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny IS not t!ie proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denied appellee equal protection. Ban Antonio 'Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, reaffirmed
that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of
a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect Class. Mandatory retirement at age 50
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
situation.
· The requirement implicates no fundamental right of
appellee. Whether a right is fundamental under the
Constitution "lies in assessing whether there is a right ...
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.'t
I d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in
·,the common occupations of the co.mrouni~y is of .the V~r;f
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essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amenclment to
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and
although provision of due process procedural safeguards
is often required as a condition to termination of government employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134
( 1973), Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 ( 1972),
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 8 the Court's
decisions give no support to the proposition that the
Constitution guarantees a right of employment per se.
See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972),
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less than
strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state
legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodriguez observed that a suspect
class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as.
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 411 U. S., at 28. The
influence of the aged in the political process has·
brought them a high degree of success in making that
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pe~sion Reform Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dis-·
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C.§ 62i
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C.
Several States have legislation forbidding age discrimina-·
8

Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in.

tP,e actiWJ. .of the R!ltirement Boar.d .
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tion, 4 including Massachusetts. 5 The participation of
the aged in the functions of decisionmaking institutions
at all levels and the continuing legislative concern at all
levels for the problems of age discrimination and the
elderly 6 demonstrate that the traditional political proc4

E. g., Cal. Unep. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat.

Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y.
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
Art. 6252-14 (1970) .
5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A.
Indeed, appellee asserts
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimination. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61.
6 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973 and January-March 1974, S. R~p. No.
93-846, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Senate Special Committee on
Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-March 1973, S.
Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March
1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Governors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) .
As appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment is one of favorable concern:
uThe thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities .and
needs, regardless of age." Brief for Appellee, .at 60.
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esses have not foundered where interests of the aged are
at stake. 7
There is no indication in any of our cases, however,
that evidence of high numerical representation in the
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group that
demonstrates the other indicia-of special disabilities or
a history of discriminatory treatment-from the category
of suspect classes. An exemption from categorization
as a suspect class based on the existence of remedial legis·
lation, for example, could penalize those who properly
seek legislative rather than judicial solutions to problems
of discrimination. It also ignores the fact that state,
as well as federal, legislatures have been responsive to the
needs of Negroes, a class that few would contend is no
longer in need of the special protection envisioned for
them by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Strauder v. West Virginia; 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, 8 such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
7 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational bene-fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal protection, stated :
· "Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to sub. ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
- basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political
·processes may have broken down." !d., at 375 n. 14.
8 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker:
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age:
'The Last Segregation (1970) ; Symposium : Law and the Aged, 17
Atiz. L. Rev 267 (1975) .
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bas1s of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truely indicative of the group's abilities. When those factors are present, there is reason to
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about
group characteristics that have no place in our constitutional system.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. Even old
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 (1938) , in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause.
II
We turn then to the inquiry appropriate in the absence
of a need for strict scrutiny. In such cases, it is neces-sary to determine whether the Massachusetts scheme
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"rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state
purpose.'' San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid.11
Perfection in the way in which the means are adapted to
serve the State's purpose is not - required.~ But judicial
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have
meaning.
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest~
S'ii J\h hiAA:ICF RE~IIill' £8&111!1; post, u*
_ that the
Court is required to engage in a substantive review of
the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an
inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distinguishes
traditional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
from the most searching review appropriate when a suspect claSsification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, ·721....:722 (1973). The requirement that a
State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that the
purpose must fall within the very broad range of powers
entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not independently infringe upon other constitutional restrictions.
The State's purpose justifying the classification must not
be illusory, a mere facade concealing the existence of an
objective that is illegitimate in this very narrow sense.
See U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (19'73);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276 (1973) .
0

9

See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940) ; Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
The presumption of validity is particularly strong with respect to
the legislative judgment m areas of economics, taxation, and the
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. In addition to the
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484 (1970) .
10
See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v.
WtUiams, supra, at 4&1.

74-1044-MEMO
MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGlA 11

~~

~ 12-1/.;:t:;,

LegislatureQcieari~dentified aj ~

The Massachusetts
st• ~ to be promoted by the age 50 classi..
fication. Through mandatory retirement at age 50,
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.11 The
legitimacy of this objective
ee
Sheltort v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v,
13oard of 13ar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee

11 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous
physique. The natUre of the duties to be performed in all weathers'
ls arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically able to
perform such duties." Mass. ta-g. boe., House No. 1582, at 8
(1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions
permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however, deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 being
the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness
of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. Though
the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after further
study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, e. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & Resolves
737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation was to
protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to respond
to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., l!ouse No.
5316, at 16, 17 (1967) ; Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21, 2325 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by the State's
maximum age scheme which sets higher mandatory retirement ages
for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. e. 32, §§ 1, a·
,{ 2) (g) , 26, (3) (a) (1966.) . as amended (Supp. 1975) .

74-1044-MEMO
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neither denies that this was the interest intended to be
served nor disputes legitimacy.1.2
Since the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement
ilQQ9Me has been (iilearl:i) 1ctentiil:e~in the legislative his~
tory, we need not decide w ether a cl'M!lldV Ictenbil:able
purpose IS ways required. We tn1nk it clear, however,
[ t at our eCisiOns mcreasingly have departed from the
extremely relaxed standard of M eGo wan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961), which indicated that the con~
stitutional requirements are met "if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify" a statutory dis~
crimination. Rather, we have required that the state
purposes to be served by the classification be capable of
being discerned by some means short of hypothezation
by a judge. See, e. g., McGinnis v. Royster, supra, at
270. That is, they must be either expressly articulated
by the legislature or clearly implicit in the statutory
scheme.18 Ingenious judges almost always will be able
to devise some basis for a state law. But the judicial
function calls for a more genuine inquiry if the constitu~
tiona.l requirement oLra.t.ion.9libr i« nnLt.rd-,o

lfp/ss
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Rider B. p. 12 (Murgia)

The legislative purpose also may be derived from the
c ontemporary interpretationfuereof by the agencies of
government entrusted with its enforcement of administration.

?
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a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this
assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court
to devise or imagine policy where none has been indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the
action taken. The proper functioning of the political
process is best served where the State bears the responsibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve
identifiable policies or· objectives. When legislation is
enacted against such a background, the Court has some
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem
and also that its decision has received a public airing.14
In such circumstances, deference to the decision of the
State is not only appropriate, but required by the demands of our democratic system.
H See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
44 (1972); 7Ue principle that the Equal Protection Clause should
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring):
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand,
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine
that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise powers
so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentia.tion fairly related to the object of regulation.
This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally, Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited upon them If larger numbers were affected.
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just
than to reqmre that laws be equal m operation.,

74-1044-MEMO
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Even though the State's purpose is clearly identifiable,
it is still necessary, of course, that the challenged classifi.,
cation bear a rational relationship to that purpose. The
relationship may not be trivial or illogical. A trivial or
illogical relationship would not only fail to comport with the requirement of ·rationality, but may
indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an
improper (for example, racially discriminatory) purpose.
''ftGiven that physical ability generally declines with age,
mandatory retirement at 50 does serve to remove from
police service those whose fitness for uniformed pdlice
work has diminished with age and is, therefore, rationally related to the State's objective. 15 There is no indication that § '26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from
service so few officers who ~re in fact unqualified as to
render age 50 a criterion "w 1 unre
h
tive of that statute." 16
eed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75
1 5 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
,. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
·officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
thjs difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this
difference that renders the different employment requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
16 Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
· group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commissiop. to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) .
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(1971). That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized te13ting after age 50
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose. 17 But where rationality is the test, a
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications m~tde by [it] are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
We do not m~e light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature 'and compulsory retirement can have on an individual, Or' of the stifled ability
of the aged to contribute to society. These problems
h~.ve been well documented ~t:P.d are beyond serious dispute.18 But ~'[w]e do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Massachusetts] 111ight ideally espouse, or that a more just and
1

17 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examinations through age 50, appellee would conceqe the rationaUty of mandatorY retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly qefeats the
ration~tlity of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the le~islative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
· individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminji.te those youn~er officers whq are not at least as healthy as
·the best fifty-year-old officers.
1 8 E. g., M. B11-rron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging : 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep.
No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ~8-53 (1972) ; Jlearings before
the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Bess., pts. 1 & 2,

46-46, 87-101, 121- 127, 212-217, 464-471

(19~7).
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humane system could not be devised." ld., at 487. We
decide only that the system enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection
of the law.
The judgment is reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case,
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MEMORANDUM

•'· o>·· J·

TO:

Chris Whitman

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

r .

DATE:

April 20, 1976

Murgia
I reviewed last night Justice Brennan's "marriage" of
his opinion with ours, and for the most part I find it quite
acceptable to me.
'

' \o;'

consideration.

I have indicated some changes for our furthftr

The only ones of substance are on page 12,

where I tried redictating the first full paragraph with the
view to making it more palatable to my Brothers who have
continued to cite McGowan.

T~ID~

is a critical paragraph in

the opinion, and requires your most delicate and artful touch.
In my opinion previously circulated, we cited only

.,.,. :r
'f.

McGinnis as evidence that the Court over the past 15 years
has required something more than McGowan.

Now that we may

., ,

possibly be writing for the Court, we should add additional :
citations.
•'

;It would be especially helpful to have a case

written by Ju•tice Blackmun or perhaps one of the other
"unconmitted" Justices.
You will note the one sentence added to footnote 13,
hoping it ' - or something like i t - will suffice
Justice White's views.

tom~

''.,1''

The revision of footnote 12 is largely cosmetic . .~ ..
~,

lil
~

ll'

~

. ~·,

...'·

2.
By the time I reached page 14, I was a bit too sleepy to
tackle the full paragraph on that page.

This also is quite

important, although not as controversial as page 12.

As

presently written, the first three sentences address the
second requirement of equal protection analysis:

that, even

when the state purpose is proper and identifiable, the means
adopted to achieve the purpose must bear a rationale relationship to the purpose.

I think Gunther has framed this second

requirement rather well, and possibly you can identify a
case or two that may be included.

My suggestion is that these

three sentences be expanded, and written abit more carefully.
The fourth sentence [Given that physical ability, etc.]
should begin a new paragraph, possibly with a transitional
sentence.

Here, we are moving from a general discussion of

equal protection analysis to the specific facts of this case.

L.F.P.,

ss

'.

.
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~
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Chris

FROM

Justice Powell

No. 74-1044 MURGIA
As you will see, I have substantially revised pages
9·14 of our second draft memorandum.
for two reasons:

(i)

I was prompted to do this

a further conversation with Justice

Stewart (who reviewed the Brennan attempt at blending our
opinions) persuades me that some changes in emphasis are
necessary if there is any real chance of obtaining his concurrence;
and (ii) ! .believe a rearrangement of Part II is desirable in
any event.
You will observe that, for the most part, my revision
is

l~ited

to a rearrangement and to some change in verbage.

I also tried to identify somewhat more clearly the Gunther
emphasis on a "means model".

I have plagiarized Gunther somewhat

more than our first draft.
You will observe that the paragraph on McGowan (p. 12)
has been omitted.

In a concurring opinion, I would not hesitate

to deal directly with McGowan.
winning a court would be

But I fear our chances of

d~inished

by even a tactful frontal

..:.

...

.'

.. .

2.

assault on McGowan.

We can make clear, by the way

the opinion is written, that I describe a standard considerably
different from that of McGowan.
The revised draft, that will accompany this memorandum
to you, reflects unedited dictation - except where I have
asked Gail to copy or include portions of the printed memorandum.
Thus, I expect you to edit, polish and rewrite to whatever extent
you think desirable.
I am conscious of some things having been omitted that
should be included, which no doubt you will identify.

For

example, I certainly do want to say that "judicial review even
under the relatively relaxed traditional standard must have
substance if the Bqual Protection Clause is to have meaning".
Also, I did not attempt to include all citations, or
to relate the text to the footnotes.
to do this than I.

You are far better equipped

Incidentally, I omitted the textual citation

to Guntaer, as I think you can find a more appropriate place
to put it.
If you have a chance to put this "humpty-dumpty" back
together again, during the early part of the week, I will give
it priority to the extent of a quick reading.

We can then

have it printed for Bill Brennan's review.

LD. F • P. , Jr.

LFP/gg
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Chris Whitman

FROM:

.Justice Powell
No. 74-1044 MURGIA
Some thoughts, dictated at random on Sunday:
I.

Would it be helpful to add a footnote in Part I

that merely lists, with a phrase describing the subject of
each, the decisions of the Court applying two-tier equal
protection?

The merit, if any, of doing this would be (i)

to remind my .Brothers of the extent of the Court's commitment
· to the two-tier analysis, and (ii) to indicate the relatively
narrow confines within which the two-tier analysis has been
confined, especially since Rodriguez.
II.

I would like to find a way to mention Jay Wilkinson's

article, as I think it a scholarly, thoughtful contribution, even
if we can't "buy it".
of all former clerks.

Moreover, I want to promote the "product"
I will be looking out for Professor

Whitman, I hope, for years to come.

We might find a place to

include a note similar to the one in the draft I initially
circulated.
III.

Justice Stewart is essential to our plurality.

We have included Jefferson v. Hackney, but if you can think of
any other opinions he has written or joined that arguably come
within the broad contours of our analysis, they should be included.
L.F .P., Jr.

•.

~

Here is a memorandum in Which I suggest an
opinion for the Court in the above case.
As you will recall, after Bill Brennan's
first circulation several months ago, several
Justices expressed differing views in dissenting : :;, ' ,
and concurring opinions. Others have not yet
· ·
,.
spoken. On April 7th I circulated a concurring
opinion, much of which was adopted by Bill Brennan ',
and circulated aa a combination of his views and
mine.

"'

"
As no court developed, Bill thereafter
generously suggested that I make such revisions
as I thought appropriate and circulate a fresh
memorandum. Bill's concern, and one we all share,
',• is to agree at least on a formulation of the
rational basis equal protection test. OUr cases
reflect a rather wide variety of formulations.
The enclosed memorandum which I developed
with considerable help from Bill Brennan, is
satisfactory to him and to me. I believe it also
will be satisfactory to Byron. At this ttme, no
one else bas seen it.
I would be happy to discuss
with you.

Mr. Justice Stewart
CC: Mr. Justice Brennan

'

.

. ·'

.

~

,"

.

.i

I''

F'
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;Dear Potter:

$..•

"'
<If"

·~·,

·~~~~:\
Here is a memorandum in which I suggest an
' "opinion for the Court in the above case.
As you will recall, after Bill Brennan's
first circulation several months ago, several
Justices expressed differing views in dissenting ~
and concurring opinions. Others have not yet
,
~ ',
, spoken. On April 7th I circulated a concurring
,, " opinion, much of which was adopted by Bill Brennan .,"~ "
and circulated as a combination of his views and
mine.
~~il.),~l~

·' .r,,, .,.

~; '~~';

l

As no court developed, Bill thereafter
generously suggested that I make such revisions
..., '
' as I thought approvriate and circulate a fresh
' ·&i
.. memorandum.
Bill s concern, and one we all share,
is the present disparity in the way in which we state
the basic test for analysis of equal protection clatma.
Although we will continue, in a good many cases, to
differ as to the results, it would be constructive
at least to bave a court formulation of the test
itself. ·~n8'MJi·.'fi·.;:~r,
J' '':
·"·,
'

~

t

I have tried to distill from relatively recent
precedents the essence of rational basis equal protection analysis. I bave not tried to write a new
standard. · ·
"
, ,· , ·.:l;
;'ill'"

·•

,,

The enclosed memorandum, which I developed
1
with considerable help from Bill Brennan, is
satisfactory to him and to me. I believe it also

'

.~

2.
·_;~'

"'!!'( '.ir

'

will be satisfactory to Byron.
one else has seen it.

'>i-'

I would be happy to discuss any part of
with you.
t •
·
...

'.\,

Sincerely,

.. Mr. '~J ustice
.,
'>·
CC: Mr •. Justice Brennan

"

.,

..

.

·

May 12,

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board v. MUrgia
' Dear Harry:
Draft opinions in this case have now been in circulation
since January. In an effort to find common ground for at
least four of us, and possibly five, Bill Brennan suggested as you know from what be said at one of our Conferences that I prepare a memorandum embodying what might be called
a compromise version of his views and mine.
I deliver to you herewith two copies of my memorandum.
Although designated a "third draft", it bas not yet been
circulated to the Conference. This memorandum was developed
in cooperation with Bill Brennan~ and it baa his approval.
Copies also were recently reviewed by Byron and Potter, and
it now has Byron's approval. Potter is willing to join if
the full paragraph beginning at the top of page 11 is omitted.
Bill and I both would very much prefer to leave the paragraph
in the opinion for its relevance to the ascertainment of
state purpose.
,
As with Byron and Potter, I am anxious to have your
views before IJ.'I.8king a general circulation of the memorandum.
I have not tried to do a "restatement" of equal protection
analysis, as this would require the unsettling of too many
prior precedents. Rather, the purpose has been to articulate
a framework of analysis for the rational basis test that a
majority of us can accept.

Bill Brennan and I tried to reach you on Monday when
each of us spoke to Potter. I know how pressed you are,
and hesitate to intrude even by a letter. If you should
wish to discuss this, Bill and I will be happy to come to
your Chambers.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Blac.kmun
lfp/ss
cc:

:Mr. Justice BreQDan
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 74·1044 -

May 18, 1976

Massachusetts Board v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I have read your letter of May 12 and the draft of your
memorandum for this case with great care. It strikes me as a
reasonable and thoughtful resolution of the views that have been
expressed in the respective circulations.
As you know from some of my comments at the conference table, I have been attracted by the middle tier concept of
equal protection. This was perceived initially, I believe, by
Gerald Gunther in his 1972 Harvard Law Review article. I had
hoped that the Court would arrive at a conclusion along that line,
perhaps this Term. There is, however, much to be said for your
approach to the rational basis test for this case and for others
like it. I therefore am content to go along with it for now.
The paragraph on page 11 is all right with me.
preference is that it be retained rather than omitted.
In sum, I would join you.

Sincerely,

14
Mr. Justice Powell

cc: Mr. Justice Brennan

My

May 19, 1976

'

'·

.·
)i.

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

:~' J ("

·""

l ·~

MEMORANDUM TO

\-

THE

CONFERENCE:

Draft opinions and memoranda in the case have been in
circulation since January. Bill Brennan made the initial
circulation, and differ~ng views were expressed thereafter
by several members of the Court. On April 7 I circulated
a concurring opinion, ~st of which was adopted subsequently
by Bill and circulated as a combination of his views and
mine.

·!

As no Court developed, Bill thereafter generously
suggested - as he stated at one of our Conferences - that
I make such revisions as I thought appropriate and circulate
a fresh memorandum. Bill's objective, and one we all share,
is to attain as much unanimity as possible on a general
formulation of the rational basis equal protection test.
I do not think we have been far apart in substance, but
the terminology employed in our cases haa varied rather
widely.

J...,
).

;~·

...

-lj •k

,..,....

''·!."

The enclosed memorandum has been seen by several of
you, as - in view of past differences - it seemed best to
seek some common ground before making any further circulation.

l

of

I would be happy to discuss any part of this with any

L.F.P.,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

May 19, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I think my views on the questions that your new
circulation covers are pretty much unchanged from the
memorandum which I earlier circulated, with respect to
which the Chief, Potter, and Harry expressed greater or
lesser degrees of agreement.
I will try to revise my
earlier memorandum to address points covered by your memorandum
which my earlier circulation did not cover, and get it out
in the reasonably near future.

Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

;

..
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

May 19, 1976

RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I am happy to join your Memorandum and hope it becomes
the opinion for the Court.

I therefore withdraw my circulated

opinion.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~-=...~~
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To: The Chief Jut ~~
n
Mr. Justice
'
M.r . Juotice
Mr. Justice Mar sha l l
Mr . Justice Blackmun
M.r . Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Just i ce Stevens
F~om:

~·.

~

. .·tr culated: - - - - - --

~

t-~f.P.

Mr . Justice Stewart

I

·.

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-1044
l\{assachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.
v.
Robert D. Murgia.
[February -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the result.
The Court says that a state law challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause may be judicially nullified if its
"purpose" is not "capable of discernment by some means
-short of hypothesizing by a court or a lawyer in the
course of litigation concerning [its] constitutionality."
Ante, p. 11. This extraordinary pronouncement strikes
me as contrary to the first principle of constitutional adjudication-the basic presumption of the cpnstitutional
validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7· Harv. L. Rev. 129 ( 1893-). The
Court's pronouncement is also specifically contrary to
teaching of Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside...i.£ any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." (Emphasis added.)
Three years ago I tried to set down in a few words
my considered understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S: 1, at 59 (concurring opinion). It is on the basis of that understanding that I concur in the judgment in this case. The

:lfu..
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~

MASSAeH"QSETTS :6D. OF R;ETIR,EMENT

'IJ·•. MUR~IA

c]as_sifi:cation made by this Massachusetts law is not,
constitutionally suspect,~ does not impinge upon a constitutionally protected right or ]iberly/ and does. not rest.
on: grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
S'tate's objective. 8 Since, the1mfore, the law is not invidiously discrinnatocy, i1l does: noi violiate the Equal
Protection Clause.

1

Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 198 (concurring
opinion).
2
Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 642 (concurring
•opinion) .
3 Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305.

,jupuuu Qitturl of !4~ ~ub: ,jmu,g
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

PERSONAL
May 21, 1976
Re:

74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Although it might be wise for me to reflect on the
problem, perhaps there is some virtue in giving you
my immediate reaction to the memorandum which you gave
me yesterday afternoon.
The "assumption that the political process is most
sensitive to the wishes of the people in a majoritarian
democracy" is certainly an important predicate for the
rule that legislative decisions are entitled to great
deference, but I would not agree that it is the only, or
indeed, the principaJ _ basis for the rule.
I would add
at least these additional justifications:
First, under any program invoJving a
of labor, whether of menial tasks
or of the high responsibility of government,
the effective delegation of responsibility
must carry with it the right to make some
mistakes. Error is an inescapable characteristic
of human endeavor, and the judiciary has neither
the power nor the ability to correct all the
errors made by a co-equal branch of government.
This is perhaps the same thought that Justice
Holmes has described as the need for some "play
in the joints," or words to that effect.
di~ision

Second, we have no special skills in making
policy judgments. Even though we phrase the
test in terms of "rational basis," we are merely
saying that a law must reflect a policy judgment
which we find acceptable.
Since the legislature
is the policy making branch of the government,
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and since we have an overriding obligation to
be neutral on questions of policy, it inevitably
must follow that we accord great deference to
legislative judgment.
Third, perhaps of greatest importance, the
strength of the judiciary is largely the consequence of its tradition of self-restraint. The
more often we substitute our judgment for the
product of the majoritarian process the greater
is the risk that our moral authority will diminish
and our mountain of work will increase.
I am sure that much more is involved, but I surely am
not persuaded that the basis for the rule of great deference
is as narrow or as easily stated as
_ page 11 of your memorandum implies.

{

Since you invited me to study the draft, perhaps you
will forgive me if I add a comment that goes somewhat beyond
the specific problem of this case.
It has been my impression
that the disputes within an appellate court that are the most
difficult to resolve are frequently over matters that do not
affect the outcome of the particular case before the court.
I had that impression (and it may well have been incorrect
because I did not understand the case as well as those who had
studied the briefs) about the dispute between you and Bill
Brennan in Franks v. Bowman.
I have that impression about
this case. For that reason, were I the author of the opinion,
I would be inclined simply to omit the material beginning in
the middle of page 10 and including the first three lines of
page 12, or to say something along the line:
"No matter what
problems may be associated with the identification of the
relevant state interest in other cases, in this case we have
no such problem . . . . "
If this type of approach is followed, sooner or later a
case will come along in which the differing statements of the
applicable rule will actually affect the outcome of the case.
It is in that kind of context, rather than in a law review
type of hypothetical analysis, that we do the best job of
hammering out rules that we will follow in future cases.
In
short, I firmly believe the virtues of the common law tradition
apply to constitutional adjudication.
If we accept that premise,
we should also minimize the amount of our obiter dicta.
I am
well aware of, and thoroughly respect, the v1ew that our rulemaking responsibility in the field of constitutional law justifies
a different approach, but I happen to feel otherwise.

- 3 -

As I said at the outset, I am responding quite frankly
and without a great deal of reflection, but I think that
is really what you want me to do even though my conclusion
differs from your proposal.
I greatly appreciate your
asking for my reactions.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

,jnprtntt Ofourl of tqt Jhlttb ~g
Jlufringhtn. ~. <If. 2Llbt~$
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 24, 1976

Re:

/

/

74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I have not come to rest on your memo but wi.th
June rushing at us I feel bound to tell you it is very
doubtful that I could join.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

<!J-ttud 4tf tlft ~nittb .:itatts
~asJri:ughttt. ~. <!J. 2llb'Jl.~

;iupTtttU

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 24, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Although in chatting with Bill Brennan I indicated
my agreement in general with the third draft of your memorandum, I still have some difficulties. On page 11, you
indicate that the legitimate purpose required must be
"capable of discernment by some means short of hypothesizing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation
. . . . " I wonder, however, if the Constitution permits
or requires us to disregard a state court's considered
holding as to the purpose of a state statute where insofar
as we are advised, the purpose attributed to a statute by
the state court is accepted by the State in applying the
State's own constitutional provisions. Arguably, under our
prior cases, we should view a state court's interpretation
as having been expressly written into the statute.
Also, on page 14, you require that the means chosen
not only be rational but also bear a fair and substantial
relation to the discerned purpose. On pages 15 and 16,
however, you refer to the test as one of "rationality" and
on page 15 indicate that the test is satisfied if the
classification is not "wholly unrelated to the objective of
the statute." I would prefer not to indicate that the "fair
and substantial relationship" requirement adds anything to
the "rationality" standard.
Perhaps we could chat about this.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Mr. Justice Brennan

.§tt.pfttttt <!fo-u:rt of tlrt 'JlUrif;r-.§tates

'jtaslrhtghm. :!B. <!f. 2n.;;>1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 25, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Since it is getting late in the year, and since the
present status of this case seems so uncertain, I thought
I would set forth in rough
memorandum.

form my reaction to your current

If your memorandum should acquire the necessary

votes for a Court opinion my letter could be used as a
basis for my concurrence in the

result~

if your memorandum

does not acquire that number of votes, my letter might
provide the basis for an opinion in support of the result
upon which we all agree.
(1) Absence of fundamental right.

I

agree entirely with your treatment of this
question on page 6 of your memorandum
opinion •

.. '
.

'

·.

.

- 2 (2) Suspect classification.

Since appellee

in his brief seems to me to all but abandon
any claim that the Massachusetts statute creates
a "suspect classification", I would not as
an original proposition think this were an appropriate
case to discourse at length upon the criteria
for determining a suspect classification.

It

seems to me that in one sentence of your
memorandum on page 9, you say virtually all that
need be said in the way of substantive analysis
on this point:
"But even old age does not define a 'discrete
and insular group

Instead it marks

a stage that each of us will reach if we live
out our normal span."
That, plus a citation to your treatment of the
subject in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, and a citation to Harry's treatment
of the subject in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.

-
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634, 642, would be adequate.

Neither the Chief

nor I, of course, agree that aliens are a
"suspect classification", but obviously we are
not in a position to insist that the conclusion
previously reached by the majority of the Court
be repudiated.
I would be somewhat concerned if all of your discussion
of the relative success of the aged in obtaining their wishes
legislatively remained in your opinion the way it is now
written.

The more general reference to the same sort of

test contained in Rodriguez seems to me to be more satisfactory
here, where appellees really are not plumping very hard
for a "suspect classification" analysis.
I add a word here in a somewhat broader context.

I

agree with you that there is a need for clarification of
equal protection doctrine, but I basically disagree with
your expansion of the "rational basis" test which I discuss
infra. It seems to me what has most troubled the lower
courts and the commentators are cases such as those involving
sex discrimination, where although the Court has stated
the test in terms of minimum scrutiny they believe that it
is applying some higher level of scrutiny.

As I read

- 4 Professor Gunther's article in 86 Harv. Law Rev. 1, which I
~ke

you to task for relying on so heavily in your

memorandum, see infra, the genesis of the article was at
least in part a felt need to explain cases such as these
and your opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S.
164.
If there is to be some sort of doctrinal expansion
in the area of equal protection -- and I am by no means sold
on the

n~cessity

or desirability for it -- it seems to me

that it should come in some area other than that of the
minimum scrutiny -- rational basis test.

I think that

your expansion of this test in the latter part of your
memorandum will simply permit lower courts to make more
erroneous decisions striking down social and economic
legislation, such as the District Court did in this case,
without in any principled way accommodating cases such
as those dealing with sex discrimination.

In other words,

if we expand the rational basis test in this opinion, we
will still be confronted further down the pike with a
demand to expand "suspect classifications" or else adopt
a "middle tier" level of scrutiny in order to accommodate
those cases.

'·
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While my own personal view of the matter is that the
standard of review in both areas should be left pretty much
the way it is, if I had to choose between some doctrine
explaining cases such as the sex discrimination cases, on
the one hand, and the across-the-board expansion of the
minimum scrutiny test which you propose, on the other, I
should unhesitatingly choose the former.

This seems to me

to be another reason why it is undesirable to say anything
more than is necessary to decide this case about "suspect
classification".

For this reason I think Potter's very

brief opinion concurring in the result has much to commend
it, although it would obviously have to be expanded if it
were to be an opinion for the Court.
{3) "Purpose": Its Legitimacy v. Its Significance.
As I now understand it, I quite agree with your
observations that there inheres in the Constitution some "requirement that a State's purpose
be 'legitimate'".

For although I do have some

difficulty seeing any difference between deciding
whether a "purpose falls within the very broad
range of powers entrusted the state legislatures"
and deciding whether it does not "independently
violate other constitutional requirements", it

'

.
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seems indisputable that a state legislative enactment
which fails to pass these tests must be held invalid.
But I draw back from some of the precepts of constitutional litigation which you seem to draw from this
requirement of

11

legitimacy.

11

As I read your memorandum, you create in equal protection
cases several express limitations upon the normal function of
courts in ascertaining legislative intent so as to reduce the
chances of their being somehow fooled by clever assertions of
purpose which may actually mask the existence of an illegitimate objective in the challenged law.
~

priori limitations

I don't see how such
on what arguments courts

may accept are likely to advance the cause in which you seek
to enlist them.

Instead, I fear that these limitations may

obscure, and must thereby eventually confuse,constitutional
adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause.
I don't think that a plaintiff, even when he assumes
the burden traditionally imposed on one challenging a
statute as being unconstitutional, will necessarily derive
much benefit from these limitations.

The burden on the

plaintiff is to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional; one of the methods by which he may do this, in

..

- 7 the terms of your memo, is to show that the statute implements
If he can do this, i.e., if as

an illegitimate objective.

you suggest in note 17, he can demonstrate that the statute
implements a racially discriminatory objective, then the
litigation is at an end.

If he cannot do so, then ex hypothes i
I

there is no "illegitimate objective" behind the statute which
could be obscured by an assertion of "illusory purpose" put
forth by counsel.
While these limitations, in my view, will not appreciably
benefit one whose challenge to a statute deserves to succeed,
I think that they will have more than one undesirable side
effect as courts come to apply them.

One such side effect

could be to divert the attention of a court from the question
of whether a statute directly contravenes the Constitution
by invidiously discriminating against a suspect class to a
focus upon discovering the "purpose" of the statute.

I must

also confess I do not understand your use of "hypothesizing"
as the antithesis of proper judicial review.

Initially, I

am not at all sure I grasp what you mean by that term.

You

suggest that the only acceptable methods of determining a
statute's purpose is either to draw upon a preamble or some
other form of legislative history or to ascertain some

•.

..

- 8 "clearly implicit" message on the face of the statutory scheme.
As to the former, however, many if not most equal protection
claims today are challenges to state legislation for which there
may exist no legislative history, preamble, etc.

Surely this

heretofore unquestioned p'ractice cannot, as a noncombatant casualty in the course of this Court's quest for a uniformly agreedupon standard for minimal scrutiny challenges under the Equal
Protection Clause, suddenly have become constitutionally
suspect.

And if your observations in note 13 that the Consti-

tution does not require state legislatures to articulate the
purpose of every legislative enactment, is meant to suggest
that it may do so with respect to some enactments, they seem
to me difficult to support in law or logic.

Moreover, the

basis for the suggestion with which you close note 13 escapes
me entirely.

I would have thought that the interpretation of

a state administrative or executive agency regarding the
meaning and purpose of the statute it was charged to enforce
was a determination of state law which would be fairly binding upon any federal court before which the issue might be
properly raised.

I can't imagine how a conclusion that there

was "hypothesizing by a lawyer" somehow involved, would entitle
a court to disregard the State's interpretation of its own law.

,'

-
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Your alternative suggestion for divining the "purpose"
of a statute, that it will usually be "clearly apparent from
the face of the enactment," may be true as to most statutes
which are passed.

But when considered against those statutes

which have led to litigation, I would have thought that the
volumes written on statutory interpretation, as well as a
very sizeable portion of this Court's case law, demonstrate
that the "purpose" of a disputed statute is seldom so easily
discernible.

Indeed, the lesson of these authorities seems

to be that it is a mistake of some dimension to assume that
there exists a single "purpose" which may be ascribed to the
legislature with regard to any particular statute, or that
courts can adequately undertake to examine the subjective
"motive" or "intent" of the legislators in performing their
review function.
All this leads me to conclude that the test which you
propose is really a very significant departure from constitutional adjudication as developed in the decisions of this
Court.

I'm not sure that the focus upon the "purpose" of

the statute, assuming that we could agree upon that aspect
of a statute's meaning, has much relevance to traditional
judicial review; at least not where there is no dispute

- 10 that only minimum scrutiny is appropriate.

I am thus much

more comfortable with Potter's suggestion that we adhere to
the test announced in cases such a McGowan:

that a statutory

legislative choice will not be invalidated unless no set of
facts can be conceived to justify it.

That formulation,

while perhaps not embodying what political scientists might
want in a model of judicial review, seems to me the proper
role for a court enforcing the Constitution which we have.
(4) Professor Gunther's "Ends-Means" Analysis.
I have the most serious reservations about that
portion of your memorandum which seems to contemplate
the bodily assumption into the Equal Protection
Clause

of Professor Gunther's article in 86 Harv.

L. Rev. 1

(1972); you refer to it approvingly once

in your text, and once again in a footnote, at
pages 10-17 of your memorandum.

Professor Gunther,

as I read his article, advances what he calls a
"model of modest interventionism", id., 24, which
he says was suggested to him by developments in
the October 1971 Term.

More than one passage in

the article seems to me to be in the area of
political science, rather than of constitutional

:

·'

·.

,•

- 11 law -- a choice which a law review commentator is
certainly free to make, · but which I am not sure
ought to be carried over into this Court's opinion.
For example, Professor Gunther says:
"It does indeed follow from the
political process theme that
legislative value choices warrant
judicial deference so long as the
people can have their say in the
public forum and at the ballot
box.

It does not follow, however,

that the Court should eschew all
concern with the relationship of
the means adopted to the legislatively chosen ends.

Means scrutiny,

to the contrary, can improve the
quality of the political process
without second-guessing the
substantive validity of its results
by encouraging a fuller airing
in the political arena of the
grounds for legislative action.

'

..

.·.·, ·. '·

... ··.

.·.

- 12 Examination of means in light of
asserted state purposes would
directly promote public consideration
of the benefits assertedly sought by
the proposed legislation; indirectly,
it would stimulate fuller political
examination, in relation to those
benefits, of the costs that would be
incurred if the proposed means were
adopted."

Id., at 44.

While I support popular government and open debate as
much as the next person, the quoted statement is pure political
science, not constitutional law; it is surely miles removed
from what this Court's decisions have ever intimated to be the
purpose or meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Gunther's article has not gone unchallenged
even among his academic brethern.

In the "Foreword" to

the Harvard Law Review issue on the Supreme Court in the
following year, Professor Tribe said of Professor Gunther's
approach:

:

..

- 13 "[His] aim of a 'relatively vigorous'
judicial scrutiny • • • evaporates
in a verbal mist whicle inviting
manipulation that conceals the
substan~ive

judgments underlying

judicial choice."
Even Professor Gunther later expressed doubts about his
proposed Equal Protection analysis when he participated in a
forum for the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly last
year:
"I recognize more difficulties now than
I spoke about in the Foreword, as to both
purposes and means, and in application.

I

would hate to be trying to decide some of
the cases which would be thrown at me to
decide.~

2 Hastings Const. L. Q., at 660.

Nor has Professor Gunther's doctrine faired particularly
well in the one case that I know of which came here after a
Court of Appeals adopted his theory.

The Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre,
476 F.2d 806, cited Professor Gunther's article, and said it

- 14 was focusing "on the actual rationality of the legislative
means under attack • • • • ", 476 F.2d 806, 815.

It held

that the Belle Terre ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The rest is history.

That judgment was reversed by this Court by a vote of seven
to two in an opinion written by Bill Douglas.

416

u.s.

1.

I think that a principal shortcoming, at least in my
opinion, of Professor Gunther's article; of some of the
intimations in your memorandum; and, of some of the language
in some of our equal protection cases, is the idea that any
single legislative "purpose" can be divined with respect to
a statute containing a number of different sections.

v

Let us suppose, for example, that the state in which
I presently reside, and the one in which you formerly
resided -- Virginia -- enacts a law entitled the "Truck
Safety Act of 1976".

It has a short preamble reciting a

history of accidents resulting from the difficulties of
safely stopping heavily laden vehicles and stating explicitly

V

This is not entirely suppositious, since it resembles
the federal statute I dealt with in a stay application in
Coleman v. Paccar, No. A-651.

'··

- .

- 15 that the

purpose of the Act is to improve highway safety in

the state.

The principal operative provision requires that

all trucks commercially licensed in Virginia having an
unladen weight in excess of five tons shall have antiskid
devices on their hydraulicbraking systems, and describes with
some particularity the type of devices which will satisfy
the statutory requirement.
The statute contains the following additional
provisions:
(1) The Act shallapply only on the
occasion of the sale or resale of a truck
which is covered by its terms.
(2) Trucks otherwise covered by the
Act which are used in connection with an
agricultural enterprise may obtain exemptions
from the provisions of the Act if their
owners make a showing of economic hardship.
One year later the Act is amended so as to provide that
it applies only to new vehicles at the time they are sold.

- 16 -

It seems to me that it is impossible to say that
single
there is any/'purpose' to this Act, notwithstanding the
preamble which would indicate the contrary.

The basic

provision is indeed designed to foster highway safety, but
the original exception would in effect grandfather in existing
trucks until they are resold, and thus avoid immediate imposition
of financial burden on those who are currently operating
trucks which would otherwise be subject to the Act.

The

amendment passed the following year still further restricts
the operation of the Act, and in effect grandfathers in all
existing trucks, even after resale.

The agricultural

exception cuts directly against the purpose of highway
safety, and would have to be justified in terms of legislative
recognition that the typical agricultural entrepreneur may be
in shakier financial condition than most other truck
operators, that the business

of agriculture was one which

the legislature wished especially to encourage, and that
therefore less stringent requirements would be applied to
trucks used in that business.

- 17 As I read pages 10-17 of your memorandum, one or more
provisions of this hypothetical statute would run into
~me

difficulty if challenged on Equal Protection grounds.

Yet if the analysis in McGowan v. Maryland, which Potter
adopts in his separate concurrence, were followed, I think
there would be no difficulty in sustaining any one of the
provisions.
As a final wrinkle, suppose that West Virginia, long
known to be less enlightened than Virginia, adopted the
same statute but fails to enact any preamble.

Does the

West Virginia statute, under your approach, fare better
or worse than the Virginia statute?
If this hypothetical poses problems, as I think it
does, it nonetheless avoids what seems to me to be one
of the most difficult problems of all under your analysis:
the situation which arises when there is genuine disagreement
about the legislative purpose behind any particular statute
or subsection of

a

statute.

Peroration. This letter is too long already, but in
the process of writing it I have gotten myself sufficiently
W)rked up so that I shall indulge myself in a bit of a
perroation.

I think the basic shortcoming of the "end-

means" analysis, of focusing on whether "the distinctions

- 18 made by a classification [are] genuinely related to the
State's purpose"

(your memorandum, p. 14) are twofold.

If

the approach means what it says, it sets up this Court,
which claims no legislative competence, to evaluate a
legislative decision to implement a particular purpose
by enacting some provision of a given statute.

It seems to

me almost inconceivable that we could correctly conclude
that a group of legislators, all devoting a good part of
their time to the art of legislation, chose a means which
was not "genuinely" related to their purpose.
If we reach that conclusion, it seems to me far more
likely that we have misconceived the legislative purpose,
or are deliberately refusing to acknowledge it, and are
therefore masking the actual operation of the Equal
Protection Clause behind a surface doctrine which set
this Court up as a tutor for legislators in order that they
may be taught how to enact statutes which carry out the
purpose that they have in mind.
Sincerely,

~JV. 'v

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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p. 10 (Murgia)

Identification of the state purpose normally presents
little difficulty.

Although the purpose may not be imagined,

it usually is apparent from the face of the statute and ita
13
legislative history.

13. AScertainment of purpose by a state court, of
course

should be respected, and substantial weight also

should be given to contemporaneous interpretation by the
administrative or executive agency charged with a statute's
enforcement.
We do note that the proper functioning of the political
process usually is best served where the policies or
objectives of the legislature are identified at the time
of enactment.

When legislation is enacted against such a

background, there is greater assurance that the legislature
has focused on the problem.

~---~~--------

--·-~--

, and ascertainment of purpose by the appropriate state
court or agency charged with a statute's enforcement, of
course, should be respected.
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To:
From:

Justice Powell

Date:

May 30, 1976

Chris Whitman
No. 74-1044

Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia

Now that I have toesed the death penalty cases into your
lap, I will take the time to write down some of my reactions
to Justice Rhenquist's memo in this case. Much of his
disagreement with our opinion is just that -- a difference in
point of view. But I do think that x he does misread what
we said in one m important respect -- which I shall explain
below.
P. 2 -- I do not think that the contention that the statute
creases a "suspect classification" is· quite as frivolous as
WHR paints it. I am sure that it does not appear to be so
to those outside the Court, who do not know that the Court
has xax£xim decided to Eia close the door on further expansion
on suspect classes -- or even to cut back on them, as WHR
and the Cmief would in the case of aliens. The only substantive
point that WHR makes, however, has to do with the discussion
of the relative success of the aged in obtaining their wishes
legislatively. I agree with WHR that that is much longer than
necessary. As I recallyit was residue from WJB's first version
which he included when he combined our two drafts. It was
my impression that we accepted it in the spirit of compromise,
for it does no real damage~ even though we may not have included
it in an opinion that we wrote from scratch.
P. 3 --It seems to me that SHR WHR's comment that the sex
discrimination cases are the most x troubling to those trying
to understand our equal protection cases is entirely correct.
But, clearly, the Court is not prepared to reach a consensus
on those. Other cases applying the rational basis test have
also created a great deal of confusion -- the very BHg debate
between you and Rhenquist exhibits the xax split amaRg in the
Court on this issue -- and xkaxxmxgkxxkHxxaxiaRaixxHsxxaxxamH
there is some hope of at least getting a £BHXX four-Justice
consensus on the approach to be used in these non-sex cases.
WHR is correct that the sex cases will continue to be a problem
pushing towards expanding the category of suspect classifications
or xkH creatin~ a middle tier.
P. 7 -- I am not as convinced as WHR that xkHXHxixxRB we can
assume that there is no illigitimate objective
where the challenger cannot demonstrate one. Implicit in our
approach, it seems to me, is that the absence of any discernible
purpose is one indication that the legislature's purpose has
been illegitimate. It seems to me that it would be almost
impossible to prove XRXMBXXXEXXHX by affirmative evidence that
a~ legislature'§ purpose is illegitimate.
Few bodies are
naive enough to be so explicit.
~iiiHgxxiamxH

2.
In asking you to XH#HEX discard ~he requirement that the
state's purpose be articulated, WHR is asking you to depart
from the views you have indicated in your past opinions.
There are cases -- the New Orleans hotdog case appears to
be one -- when this difference of opinion will make the
difference in the result one reaches. ~BHxma~XEXRXXXE
rHEBRXXBHxxwkHxkHx And, to that ~xtent, your view does
put the Court in a more active ~. The problem with
WHR's view is that it seems to deprive the Court of any
role, except for the devising of conceivable justifications
a purely theoretical and meaningless exercise.
~¥xKixaRBXX P. 14 and following -- The hypothesis WHR
\
presents here reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
our opinion -- and indicates that we should clarif~ tpe
eg int. We do not look at the rela t 1on 6f che means to the
en ~ f the statute as a whole. Nor do we insist that there
only be a single end. Rather, we require that the rreans be
related to the purpose sxxxkHx,axxxEHiaxxEiaxxxxxEaxxsR (or
one of the several purposes) of the particular E:iaxxf classification
under attack. Thus, in WHR 1 s example, the statute woufd pass
cons 1 utional muster.
The grandfather HXEH,XXBR clause can
be justified by a desire to avoid immediate imposition of the
financial burden on EHXXHi~s,HxaxxsR those currently operating
trucks.xxxsxxaiixsiB The exception for agriculatural equipment
is rationally related to the purpose of encouraging (or not
destroying) agriculaure. The court need not be concerned
with how these provisions serve the overall purpose of the
Act -- unless they XBxaii~XBH,XXlllfXXHHX:AEXXBXXRR~ create
exceptions so large that the Act does not serve its overall
purpose at all and becomes axmH simply a means of imposing
a meaningless burden on those not excepted.

Chris

..

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-1044
Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
v.
District of Massachusetts ..
R,obert D. Murgia.
[April -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I am in accord with the result reached by the Court
and with much of the reasoning underlying that result.
I think it appropriate, however, in view of the discussion
that has arisen among the Members of the Court, to express my views on the proper analysis to be applied in
determining whether the Massachusetts legislation comports with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree that the
proper inquiry is whether the State's classification "rationally relates to the furtherance of the State's announced objective." Ante, at 10. 1 I cannot, however,
1 MR. JusTICE MARSHALL makes an appealing case in his concurring opinion for a new formulation of equal protection analysis.
He proposes, as I understand it, a "middle-tier" type of test. When
I came on the Court (January 1972) "two-tier" analysis was firmly
established by prior decisions. See, e. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403
U. S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1969). See
also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1065, 1076-1132 (1969). Rod1iguez, like similar cases involving the
funding of education (see, e. g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971), had been decided below and was argued
before us on the assumption that the Court was committed to this
analytical approach. In writing for the Court in that case, I accepted and attempted to define more clearly the boundaries of two-
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accept the Court's central position that a high degree of
political participation in itself is sufficient to support the
conclusion that those of middle age do not form a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis.
I
I turn first to the question whether the most demanding judicial scrutiny appropriately is applied to the classification made by Massachusetts. Although I depart in
some respects from the Court's reasoning, I concur in its
conclusion that strict scrutiny is not proper.
As the Court indicates, appellees can point to no fundamental personal rights that are infringed by Massachusetts' compulsory retirement scheme. We have said, in
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,
33-34 ( 1973), that "the key to discovering" whether a
certain interest is " 'fundamental' is not to be found in
cbmparisons of . . . relative societal significance" or in
weighing relative impot'tance: "Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right ... expiicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." See also, e. g.,
tier analysis. This is not to say the Constitution requires such
5tnalysis or that I would have embraced it initially had I been on the
Court at the time it was adopted. But whatever formulation is
used, certain types of legislative enactments and classifications will
be scrutinized more closely than others. Until a majority of the
Court wishes to attempt a new formulation, I think we must adhere
to the existing precedents.
One does find in the literature creative and intriguing ideas, in
addition to the not undeserved criticism of the ambiguity and even
fnconsistency in some of our opinions. E. g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975); Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969).
For the most part, the proposals made would require a dramatic
departure from existing precedent.
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:Selle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). There is no constitutional guarantee, explicit or implicit, of a right to continue in employment indefinitely, free of compulsory
termination at a specified age. I am particularly mindful that a decision to the contrary in this case-where the
State has an interest as both legislator and employerwould represent a serious intrusion upon the State's flexibility in determining the qualifications necessary to ensure that law enforcement personnel have optimum
fitness and morale and in developing an ordered pension
and retirement plan for its employees.
For reasons different from those relied upon by the
Court, I also conclude that the class of persons subject to
compulsory termination under Massachusetts' statute
does not constitute a suspect class. The "traditional indicia of suspectness" were defined in Rodriguez, supra, at
28. We are to consider whether
"the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."

There is no indication in any of our cases that evidence
of high numerical representation in the state legislatures
or the existence of a body of remedial legislation is alone
sufficient to remove a group that demonstrates the other
indicia-of special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treatment-from the category of suspect classes.
An exemption from categorization as a suspect class
based on the existence of remedial legislation, for example, could penalize those who properly seek legislative
rather than judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It also ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures have been responsive to the needs of
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blacks, a class that few would contend is no longer in
need of the special protection envisioned for them by the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ( 1880). Moreover, I believe it inappropriate for the Court to embark upon the
task, highly charged with political ramifications, of evaluating 'vhen a given group is sufficiently represented in
the legislatures or sufficiently protected by legislation to
justify a relaxation of strict judicial scrutiny.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather,
it draws the line at a certain age in · middle life. Even
if the statute cotild be said to impose a penalty upon a,
class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinc·
tion sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have
found suspect to call fot strict judicial scrutiny.
The Court's opinion acknowledges that persons of mature age have not suffered any deprivation of political
power. indeed, they may have a unique influence on the
political dccisionmaking, especialiy in those legislatures
where leadership is allocated on a seniority basis. Moreover, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin,
have not experienced a ahistory of purposeful unequal
treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truely indicative of the group's abilities. When those factors are
present, there is reason to scrutinize state classifications
carefully to ensure that they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about group characteristics that
have no place in our constitutional system. Even old
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
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152-153, n. 4 ( 1938) , in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause.
II
In defining the test to be applied in this case, I am in
basic agreement with the opinion for the Court. We
must determine whether the Massachusetts' scheme "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid. 2
Perfection in the way in which the means are adapted to
serve the State's purpose is not required. 3 But judicial
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have
meaning.
The term "legitimate" state purpose docs not suggest,
as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST fears, that the Court is reSee, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
The presumption of validity is particularly strong with respect to
the legislative judgment in areas of economics, taxation, and the
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. In addition to the
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471 ( 1970).
3 See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v.
Williams, supra, at 485.
2
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quired to engage in a substantive review of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an inquiry of this
sort is one of the factors that distinguishes traditional
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause from the
most searching review appropriate when a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.
717, 721 (1973). The requirement that a State's purpose
be "legitimate" indicates only that the purpose must fall
within the very broad range of powers entrusted the state
legislatures and that it must not independently infringe
upon other constitutional restrictions. The State's pur•
pose justifying the classification must not be illusory, a
ine~e facade concealing the existence of an objective that
is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See McGinnis
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
In this case, as the opinion for the Court points out,
the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement scheme was
clearly identified in the legislative history. We need not
decide, therefore, whether a clearly identifiable purpose is
always required. I think it clear, however, that our
decisions increasingly have departed from the extreme.ly
relaxed standard of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
425-426 (1961), which indicated that the constitutional
requirements are met if "any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify" a statutory discrimination.
Rather, we have required that the state purposes to be
.served by the classification be capable of being discerned
by some means short of hypothezation ·by a ·judge. See,
e. g., McGinnis v. Royster, supra, at 2i0. That is, they
must be either expressly articulated by the legislature or
clearly implicit in the statutory scheme. 4 Ingenious
4

This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legislative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is helpful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing
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judges will almost always be able to devise some basis
for a state law. But the judicial function calls for a
more genuine inquiry if the constitutional requirement of
rationality is not to be meaningless.
The great deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled under this relaxed
scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the political
· process is most sensitive to the wishes of the people in
· a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this
..' assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court
to devise or imagine policy where none has been indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the
action taken. The proper functioning of the political
process is best served where the State bears the responsibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve
identifiable policies or ,objectives. When legislation is
enacted against such a background, the Court has some
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem
and also that its decision has received a public airing. 5
In such circumstances, deference to the decision of the
State is not only appropriate, but required by the demands of the separation of powers doctrine and our
federal system.
The necessary relationship between the challenged
·Classification and the articulated or clearly implicit state
·purpose has been defined in the Court's opinion as "fair
and substantial." This term has been used by the Court
in other cases applying traditional scrutiny. 6 I have
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to
every piece , of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly
apparent from the face of the enactment.
5 Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for .a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 44
·::, •. (1972). '
' ·,
6 See, e. g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U. S. 361, 374 (1974); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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understood the term-as our conclusion in this case indicates-to signify only that the relationship be rational,
something more than trivial or illogical. A trivial or
illogical relationship would not only fail to comport with
the requirement of rationality, but may indicate that the
defined purpose actually masks an improper (for example,
racially discrimina.tory) purpose. Where the means
chosen is rationally related to the legislature's purpose,
it need not be necessary or the best scheme devisable to
serve the chosen end. 7 Nor does the Constitution require that the classification be as narrowly drawn or
precisely tailored as possible. Rather, it accepts the
need to make rough accommodations in thee ourse of
devising political solutions. In this case it is sufficient
to say, as appellees concede, that physical ability declines
with age. Where, as here, the job is arduous and physically demanding, requiring that those who hold it be in
top physical condition, the State's decision to require
retirement after a certain age comports with the require. m~mts of the Equal Pnhection Clau.Se,

This further requirement is imposed only when the Court en~ gages in the most exacting scrutiny. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717,
722 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
7
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
I am m accord with the result reached by the Court
and with much of the reasoning underlying that result,
r think it appropnate, however, in light of the exchange
of views among the Members of the Court, to express
my thmking as to the proper analysis to be applied in
determining whether the M assachusetts legislation comports with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree that the
proper mq uiry is whether the State's classification "rationally relates to the furtherance of the State's announced ob.1ective." Ante, at 10 1 l cannot, however,
1 MR ,JU::lTICE. MARSHALL makes an appeahng case in his dissentmg OpiniOn for :1 new formulation of equal protection analysis.
He proposeo;, ao; I understand It, a "middle-tier " type of test. When
[ came on thr C'ourt (.January 1972) "two-tier " analysis was firmly
established by pnor decisiOnb See, e. g., Graham v. R ichardson, 403
P S 365 (1971) . Shaptro v T hompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) ;
Harper \ V7rmma Bonrd of Electwns, 383 U S. 663 (1966). See
abo Drveloprnent;; m the Law-Equal ProtectiOn, 82 Harv. L. Rev
1065, 1071i- 11:32 ( 19119) Rodnou.ez, hke similar cases mvolving the
funchng of Pdnratwn (sre, e q ., Serrano v Pnest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
41{7 P 2d 1241 ( 1971), Van Dusartz v Hat field, 334 F .
Supp. 870 ( Mmn 1971)), had been decided below and was argued
before u;; on th<' assmnptwn that the Court was committed to t his
analytic•:JI fl pproarh In wntmg for thr Court m t hat rase, I ac•
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accept the Court's central position that a high degree of
political participation in itself is sufficient to support the
conclusion that those of middle age do not form a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis.

li
I turn first to the question whether the most demanding JUdicial scrutiny appropriately should be applied to
the classification made by Massachusetts. Although I
depart in some respects from the Court's reasoning, I concur m its conclusion that strict scrutiny is not proper.
As the Court indicates, appellees can point to no fun~
damental personal rights that are infringed by Massachusetts' compulsory retirement scheme. We have said, in
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,
33-34 ( 1973), that "the key to discovering" whether a,
certain interest is " 'fundamental' is not to be found in
comparisons of
relative societal significance" or in
weighing relative importance: "Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right ... explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." See also, e. g.,.
0

0

•

cepted and attempted to define more clearly the boundaries of twotier analysis . Thts 1~ not to say the Constitution requires such
analysis or that 1 would have embraced it initially had I been on the
Court at the tim«.> 1t was adopted. But whatever formulation is
ur:,ed, certam types of legtslattve enactments and classifications properly will be t>crutmized more closely than others. Until a majority
· of th«.> Court wtshes to attempt a new formulatiOn, I think we must
adhert' to the existing prt'cedents.
In addttlon to the not undeserved criticism of the ambiguity and
even mcoruiistency m some of our opimons, one does find in the
hteniture creat1ve and mtngmng ideas. E . g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
ConstitutiOnal Equality , 61 Va . L. Rev . 945 (1975); Michelman, .
On Protectmg the Poor Through the Fourte«.>nth Amendment, 83
Harv . L. Rev 7 ( 1969) For the most part, the proposals mad.e.
would reqmrP H dr:mwnr rlepa rturP from extstmg precedents .

....

,'

.·
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). There is no
constitutional guarantee, explicit or implicit, of a right to
contmue in employment mdefinitely, free of compulsory
termination at a specified age. I am particularly mindful that a decision to the contrary in this case-where the
State has an interest as both legislator and employer~
would represent a serious intrusion upon the State's flex~
ibility in determining the qualifications necessary to ensure that law enforcement personnel have optimum
fitness and morale and in developing an ordered pension
and retirement plan for its employees.
For reasons different from those relied upon by the
Court, I also conclude that the class of persons subject to
compulsory termination under Massachusetts' statute
does not constitute a suspect class. The "traditional in~
dicia of suspectness" were defined in Rodriguez, supra, at
28. We are to consider whether

"the class 'is .
saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma,toritarian political process."
0

0

There ts no indicatiOn m any of our cases that evidence
of high numerical representation in the state legislatures
OJ" the existence of a body of remedial legislation is alone
sufficient to remove a group that demonstrates the other
indicia-of special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treatment-from the category of suspect classes.
An exemptiOn from categorization as a suspect Class·
based on the existence of remedial legislation, for ex-·
ample, could penalize those who properly seek legislative·
rather than JUdicial solutions to problems of discriminatiOn It also ignores the fact that state, as well as fed-·
e.r.al, leg;Islat,ures, have bPen responsive to the needs o!
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Negroes, a class that few would contend is no longer in
need of the special protection envisioned for them by the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). Moreover, I believe 1t inappropriate for the Cou,rt to embark upon the
task, highly charged with political ramifications, of evalu~
ating when a given group is sufficiently represented in
the legislatures or sufficiently protected by legisl11tion to
.i ustify a relaxation of strict judicial scrutiny.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather,
it draws the line at a certain age in middle life. Even
if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a
class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have
found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny.
The Court's opinion acknowledges that persons of mature age have not suffered any deprivation of political
power. Indeed, they may have a unique influence on the
political decisionmaking, especially in those legislatures
where leadership is allocated on a seniority basis. Moreover, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discrimmated against on the basis of race or national origin,
have not experienced a uhistory of purposeful unequal
treatment'' or been subjected to unique disabilities on
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truely indicative of the group's abilities. Wheu those factors are
present, there is reason to scrutinize state classifications
carefully to ensure that they are not influenced by l.,lllfounded assumptions about group characteristics that
have no place in our constitutional system. Even old
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
u~nited Btates v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,

.:·
f,

..
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152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec~
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection
ClaUSf'o
II
In defining the test to be applied in this case, I am in
basic agreement with the opinion for the Court. We
must determine whether the Massachusetts' scheme "ra~
tionally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." San Antonio School Di$trict v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid. 2
Perfection in the way in which the mel:+ns 'are adapted to
serve the State's purpose is not requirecV But judicial
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have
meaning.
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest,
as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST fears, that the Court is re ..
See, e. g., San Antonio Sckool Dist'r-ict v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 7&--79 (1911) .
The presumptiOn of validity is partiCularly strong with respect to
the legislative judgment m areas of economics, taxation, and the
allocatiOn of necessarily limited state resources . In addition to the
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972);
Rtcha.rdson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484 (1970)
8 See, e g., Rwhardson v Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v.
2

·w,.tliam81 .mpra1 at 485.
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qutred to engage in a substantive review of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an inquiry of this
sort is one of the factors that distinguishes traditional
scrutif1.Y u;nder the Equal Protection Clause from the
most searcring review appropriate when a suspect classification is involved. Se!=l, e. (J., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.
717, 721-722 (1973). The reqtJirement that .a State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that the purpose must
fall within the very broad range of powers entrusted the
state legislatures and that it must not independf3ntly infringe upon other constitutional restrictions. The State's
purpose justifying the classification must not be illusory,
a mere facade concealing the existence of an objective that
is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See McGinnis
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
In this CftSe, .as the opinion for the Court points out,
the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement scheme was
clearly identified in the legislative history. ' We need not
decide, therefore, whether a clearly identifiable purpose is
always required. I think it clear, however, that our
decisions increasingly have departed from th~ extremely
relaxed standard of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
426 . (1961), which indicated that the constitutional
requirements · are met ~'if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify" a statutory discrimination.
Rather, we have required that the state purposes to be
served by the classification be capable of being discerned
by some means short of hypothezation by a judge. See,.
e. g., McGinnis v. Royst·er, supra, at 270. That is, they
must be either expressly articulated by the legislature or
clearly implicit in the statutory scheme. 4 Ingenious
I

1

4 '!'his is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to•
·articulate, Ill a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legislative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preamblP.s is helpful, and is a pohcy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing;
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judges almost always will be able. to devise some basis
for a state law. But the judicial function calls for a
more genuine inquiry if the constitutional requirement of
rationality is not to be meaningless.
The great deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled under this relaxed
scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the political
proce&s is most sensitive to the wishes of the people in
a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this
assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court
to devise or ifl1agine policy where none has been indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the
action taken. The proper functioning of the political
process is best served where the State bears the responsibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is·
enacted ag11inst such a background, the Court has some
guarantee that the legislature has' focuseq on the problem
and also that its decision has received a public airing. 5
In such circm~stances, deference to the decision of the
State is not only appropriate, but required by the demands of the separation of powers doctrine and our
federal system.
The necessary relationship between the challenged
classification and the articulated or clearly implicit state
purpose has been defined in the Court's opinion as "fair
and substantial." This term has been used by the Court
In other cases applying traditional scrutiny.6 I have
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to·
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly·
apparent from the face of the ena.ctment.
6 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing·
Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
44 ( 1972)
6
See, e. g, Johnson v Robmson, 415 U.S. 361,374 (1974), quot~·
ing }f. S. Uou.~tPr Guano ro v. Virginia, 253 U . S. 412, 415 (1920) ..
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understood the term-as our conclusion in this case indi..
cates-to signify only that the relationship be rational,
something more than trivial or illogical. A trivial or
tllogical relationship would not only fail to comport with
the requirement of ,rationality, but may indicate that the
defined purpose actually m~sks an improper (for example,
racially discrimi11atory) purpose. Where the means
chosen is rationally related to the legislature's purpose,
it need not be necessary or the best scheme devisable to
serve the chosen end. 7 Nor does the Constitution require that the classification be as narrowly drawn or
precisely tailored as possible. Rather, it accepts the
need to make rough accommodations in the course of
devising political solutions. In · this case it is sufficient
to say, as appellees concede, that physical ability declines
with a.ge. Where, as here, the job is arduous and physically demanding 1 requiring that those who hold it be in
top physical condition, 't he State's decision to require
retirement after a certain age comports with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.

This further requirement is imposed only whep. the Court en~
gages m the most exactmg scrutiny' In re Griffiths, supra,
7'J2; McLaughl~n v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (19!34) .
7
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
~~
This case presents the question whether the provision ~ ._,1
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uni~
~J
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired . . . upon his M~ ~;. ~ _ . ::.. . .
attaining a~e
denies appellee police offi£,¥r equal - ,~-
protection of t e laws in violation of the Fourteenth ~ ~
1
Amendment.
~ ...£~~~

tHty,"

__ . __

1

~--

Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
JA ~
• - ~
"§ 9A. Division of state police; additional appointments; rules and ~ ~
regulations; removals; training; expenditures
1"1)
··
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more ~
~
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
~ ~ ." A
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
r
-.~ J ..
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
~
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common- ~
•
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
..lfl....- ~ •
and of police officers and watchmen . , . No person who has not r:::r;..
._,_,
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
rt S ~_
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
~
the division of state police, except that sa1d maximum age quahfica-·
~/(1

1"9 ,

_

N4-?~f
~
•'' ,.

''

.,_
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer m the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operatiOn of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge dismissed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F . Supp. 1140 (1972) , On appeal, the
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer . ..."
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides :
" (a) . . . Any . officer appomted under section nine A of chapter
twenty-two .. who has performed service m the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the exp1ratwn of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . officer ... who has performed service ... for not
less than twenty years and who has not attamed . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appomted under the smd sectwn nme A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an exammatwn of such officer or mspector by a registered
physician appomted by 1t, shall report m writmg to the state board
of retirement that he IS physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such mcapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the exp1rat10n of 20 years' service
2 .Junsdictwn was mvoked
pursuant to 28 U S C. § 1343,
and declaratory and InJunctive rehef was sought under 28 U. S C
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protectiOn denial was alleged to constituate a vwlatwn of 42 U S. C. § 1983 Appellee made no clmm
under the Federal Age D1scnmmat10n m EmploymPnt Act of 1967,
29 U S C § 621 pf' 8P(J
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United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeaL 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous. 1' 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated. 1' Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755.
These considerations account for the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
annually pass a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed.-·

74-1044-0PINION
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ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that when retired his excellent physical and mental
health rendered him still capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians :
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The accociate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. !d., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see San Antonio Independent School District v.
RodrigueJ_, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson,
3W U. S. 618 (1969), for it determined that the age
classification established by the Massachusetts statutory
scheme c uld not in any event wit stand a test of
rati2.MJ.ity, see eed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 1 1971 .
mce
there had been no showing that reaching age 50 forecast
"imminent change" in an officer's physical condition,

DC
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the District Court held that compulsory retirement at
age 50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the pro12.~ standard by which tote"St whether
compUlsory retirement at age'" 5o violates equal protection.
,
A
.,J...
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deterIDination that tiie a ge 50 classification is not rationally ::;;~ '\
related to furtherm ale 1timate state interest.
e need only briefly state our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denied appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, reaffirmed
that equal protection analysi; requires strict scrutiny of
a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class. Mandatory retirement at age 50
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
situation.
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of
appellee. Although the "right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 ( 19,15), and
although provision of due process procedural safeguards
is often required as a condition to termination of government employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134
(1973), Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) ,
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 8 the Court's
decisions give no support to the proposition that the
8 Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in
the action of the Retirement Board.

'·

.

74-1044-0PINION
6

MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

\
Constitution guarantees a right of employment per se,
d----.{invllinerable
co u sory term1 10
a s es a
itimate governmental interes
ee San Antonio Indepen en Schoo Dtstrict v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471 (1970) . Accordingly, we have expressly
stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the
availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge
v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodrigue~ observed that a su~t
· class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjectea
rc;-;uch a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 411 U. S., at 28. While the
history of the aged in this Nation is not wholly free of
discrimination/ their influence in the political process
has brought them a high degree of success in making that
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Reform Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C. § 62i
et seq., Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C.
age discriminatiOn/ mcluding Massachusetts.6 The par"\

4 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker :
Age DiscnmmatJon m Employment (1965), Comment, 41 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966) . See also C. Townsend, Old Age .
The Last SegregatiOn (1970) ; Symposmm · Law and the Aged, 17
Ariz. L. Rev. 267 (1975)
5 E. g., Cal. Unep. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972) ; Mich. Stat.
Ann. ~§17.458(1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp.1975), NY.
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended
(McKinney Supp 1975-1976) , Pa. Stat. Ann. tit, 43, §§ 951-963
[Footnote 6 is on. p. ?']
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'ticipation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative
concern at all levels for the problems of age discrimination and the elderly 7 demonstrate that the traditional
political processes have not foundered, and thus classifi=
cations based on age are not considered suspect,8
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976) ; Tex. Rev, Civ. Stat. Ann.
Art. 6252-14 (1970) .
6 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimination. As to determmatwns under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61
7 See, e. g., Senate SpeCial Committee on Aging, Developments in
Aging : 1973 and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No 93-846, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ; Senate Specml Committee on Aging, Developments in Agmg. 1974 and January-Apnl 1975, S. Rep. No.
94-250, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Senate Specml Committee on
Aging, Developments in Aging. 1972 and January-March 1973, S.
Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Senate Special Committee on Agmg, Developments in Agmg : 1971 and January-March
1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) , Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate
Special Committee on Agmg, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), The Governors Special Planmng CommisSIOn on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of
Massachusetts Elderly (1971), Special Report of the Retirement
Law CommiSSion, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) .
As appellee recognizes, the attitude of legislatures, including Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment
is one of favorable concern:
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon
generalized misconceptwns as to age, and to institute in their stead
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and
needs, regardless of age." Bnef for Appellee, at 60.
8 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a
federal legislative classificatton denying Veterans' educational bene--
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We turn then to the inquiry appropriate in the absence
of a need for strict scrutiny, that is, whether the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... rest [s] upon
some ground of difference havin a fair and substantial
re~ of th~ legislation.
nson v.
RObiso"ri,415"1t.' s. 361, 374 (19·74). See eber . Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164
; Reed v.
Reed, supra. The substance of such inquiry is essentially
whether the classification is reason~ly related to a legllimate state objective.
- '!'he n'assacfi usetts Legislature clearly identified a
state interest to be promoted by the age 50 classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50,
the legislature sought to protect the public by assuring
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.9 The
fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal pro~
tection, stated:
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to subject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
basis of the 'suspect classificatiOn' theory, whose underlying rationale
is that, where legishtion affects discrete and msular minorities, the
presumptiOn of constitutiOnality fades because traditional political
processes may have broken down ." !d., at 375 n. 14
9 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous
physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all weathers
is arduous in the extreme. . . , No argument is needed to demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically able to
perform such duties ." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, at 8
( 1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions
permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the contention of the CommissiOner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should br eligible to retirement, is unsound as a,

'

'

\

..
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legitimacy of this objective may not be gainsaid. See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v,
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be
served nor disputes legitimacy. 10 There remains then only
the question whether mandatory retirement at age 50
reasonably relates to the State's announced purpose.
e are not unmindful that the age-based classification here bears, in some important respects, a resemblance to the sex-based classification we invalidated as
unreasonable inR eed v. Reed, supra. In Reed, as here,
the classification was motivated by an overgeneralization
as to the incompetence of a class to perform certain
tasks. More significantly, age has some of the same
characteristics attributed to sex in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), where another sex-based
classification was invalidated: ~e, !£o, "is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,'Y

l
I

matter of public policy." ld., at 8. The commission, however, deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 being
the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness
of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. Though
the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after further
study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & Resolves
737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation was to•
protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to respond
to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., House No.
5316, at 16, 17 (1967), Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21, 2325 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly imphed by the State's
maximum age scheme which sets higher mandatory retirement ages
for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3
(2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975) .
1-'0 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23.
The identification of this objective suffices to answer appellee's contention and makes unnecessary
consideration whether prq,motion of the State's interest in providing
e.conomic security for its employees does also.

,_

...

......

,.y
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id., at 686, and "frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society." Ibid. But in this
case we deal with a classification affecting the interests
of a group, which, in fact, clearly has considerable
capacit for influencing policy decisions affectin their
i~ewts. Tl;_us, un 1 e women, this is not a group that
has been the _§_UQJ ect of conspiCUOUS a~rimination in
~ that1's ";;,stly underrepresented_i!l
his nation's decisionmaking councils." I d., at 6'"86 n. 17.
t is in this regard that the s1£uah on in this case is unlike
the situation in cases such as Johnson v. Robison, supra;
James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128; and Weber v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., supra. Accordr ty ] great deference is appropriately given to the leg1s a 1ve accommo~
dation!\ conflicting considerations relating to the State's
announced purpose, and our inquiry ceases with a determination that the age 50 classification rationally relates
to the furtherance of the State's announced objective.
We turn to that deterl+liRation.
Given that p~ysical ability generally declines with age,
mandatory retirement at 50 does serve to remove from
police service those whose fitness for uniformed police
work has diminished with age and is, therefore, rationally related to the State's objective.'-1. There is no indi11 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection
through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral Arg.,
at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. The
sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel.
It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that the
work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg Doc., House No . 2500, at 21-22 (1955) And it. is this
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cation that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from
service so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to
render age 50 a criterion "wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." 12 Reed v. Reed, supra, at 75,
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more
precisely through individualized testing after age 50 is
not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose. 13 But where rationality is the test, a
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by [it]
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
'

0

stitute our judgment for the legislature's, a result "far
too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the
Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down
difference that renders the different employment requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
12
Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) .
13 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina~
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by e.ven
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
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state laws 'because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' "
Id., at 484.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retirement can have on an individual, or of the stifled ability
of the aged to contribute to society. These problems
have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute.14 But " [w ]e do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and
humane system could not be devised." Id., at 487. We
decide only that the system enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection
of the law.
The judgment is reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

14 E . g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956) , Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep
No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-53 (1972); Hearmgs before
the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2.
46-46, 87-101! 121-127, 212-217, 464-47 1 (1967) .
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 2, 1976

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia
Dear Bill:
Without addressing here some of our differing views as
to how the standard of equal protection analysis should be
framed, I write to clarify one point as to which there simply
is a misunderstanding.
The hypothetical Virginia statute, posed in your letter
(pp. 14-17), rests on an assumption that I would require a
single legislative purpose and that the challenged classification be measured against the purpose of the statute as a
whole. This is not my view. I would require that the means
chosen by the legislature be rationally related to the
purpose of the particular classification under attack. In
addition a rational relationship to any one of several express
or implicit purposes would be sufficient.
In my view, the statute you describe would contain no
constitutional infirmities. The grandfather clause would
be rationally related to the purpose of avoiding immediate
imposition of a financial burden on those who already have
acquired and begun operating trucks without contemplating
the requirements of the new statute. And the exception for
agricultural equipment would be rationally related to the
objective of encouraging (or not destroying) the business of
agriculture. Ordinarilly the Court would not consider whether
these provisions serve or undercut the overall purpose of the
Act.
I will clarify this point in any subsequent circulation
of the memorandum.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

lfp/ss

6/2r~

MEMORANDUM
Chris Whitman

TO:

DATE:

June 2, 1976

F. Powell, Jr.
Murgia
this brief memorandum at home (Tuesday night)
have found time - at long last - to read your memorandum
commenting on Rehnquist's memo in Murgia.
We have been under such pressure to meet the June 1
"deadline" that I have not reported to you on my rather disquieting talk with Justice Stewart.

He is "hung up" as others

have been, with our favorite paragraph on purpose.

This is

the same paragraph Justice Stewart wished us to take out,
but Justice Brennan insists - at least until now - that we
" retain. ,

' ,,
1.'

..

Justice White conceded that he had told Bill Brennan
he would join the draft.

More careful study (and possibly

Rehnquist's circulation) seem to have left Justice White
undecided.

He indicated that he might suggest some changes.
.
I have been awaiting further word from him.
Although I am more than a little bit discouraged as to
the prospect of holding four of us together, I do think it
is desirable to correct Bill Rehnquist's misapprehension as
to what we have said at page 14

'

:o,_.~

~

seg.

'

2.
&ather than change the opinion itself without having
,.

heard from White, I would appreciate your drafting a letter
to Rehnquist on this point, stating also that it will be
'(•

clarified in any subsequent circulation of the opinion.

L.F.P.,
88

''

''·•

!
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:~
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1

\.
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lfp/ss

13.

6/4/76

Rider B, p. tO (Murgia)

Of course,

ascertainn~nt

of purpose by a

state court should be respected, and substantial weight
also should be given to the interpretation by the
administrative or executive agency charged with a statute's
enforcement.
We do note that the proper functioning of the political
process usually is best served where the policies or
objectives of the legislature are identified at the time
of enactment.

When legislation is enacted against such a

background, there is greater assurance that the legislature
has focused on the problem.

lfp/ss

~

14/76

Rider A,

~

-

• 10 (Murgia)

'

Identification of the state purpose normally presents
little difficulty.

Although the purpose may not be imagined,

it usually is apparent from the face of the statute and its
13
legislative history.

1976

''

·'

Board of

"; uere is my r_revision of Murgia.
Bill

'' I have omitted the discussion of purpose (p. 11) that
~ennan and . . l liked, but that troubled several of you.
:it,';\((

'

~~~.

~· ;•.

In my view, the memorandum reflects no change in
Equal Protection· doctrine. ,
. l ·~t
~
,
~

.

~

.

Although Bill Brennan approves of my resubmitting this
to the Conference, I understand that be will not join an
opinion that omits - as this memorandum now does - the ,
referred to above.
'' '
discussion of
.~:·'
.· .....
·p

· .....

88

.. ·
'·'
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 9, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
As you know, I have come full circle more than once
in this case; and I apologize if I have wasted your and Bill
Brennan's time, particularly since I now find that I much
prefer to put aside any effort to pacify the law review
critics or commentators and to attempt to clarify our equal
protection standards for the benefit of the district judges
and courts of appeals.
One reason, among others, driving me in this direction is the fact that you have joined Ha~ry Blackrnun's
opinions in Lucas, No. 75-88, and Norton, No. 74-6212. I
had thought that your Murgia draft intended to redefine and
somewhat stiffen the rationality test by requiring a demonstration that the classification bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the ascertained purpose or purposes of the
statute. Yet in Lucas and Norton, equal protection cases in
which you would apply the fair and substantial relationship
test, the sole justification for the classification appears
to be administrative convenience which is no more than a
secondary purpose at best. If this consideration alone
satisfies the test, then it is even less help than the unadorned rationality standard. Rather than confuse the law
further, I would prefer that Murgia be decided in the name
of rationality only, as it easily could be. I am of the
same opinion with respect to Lucas and Norton.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

June 9, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Your most recent draft in this case has accommodated
many of the concerns I expressed as to the earlier draft,
and with the end of the Term hopefully in view, I will try
to do some accommodating of my own. I joined Harry's
Mathews v. Lucas opinion notwithstanding my disagreement
with some of the language relating to the Equal Protection
Clause test, and I am willing to join your opinion on
pretty much the same basis. That basis is that neither of
these cases be treated as a definitive reassessment of the
proper standard of review where only minimum scrutiny is
to be applied.
I fu11damentally disagree with your stress on "purpose",
as if this were an element which could be wholly isolated
from the enacted statute itself, with some "ends-means" test
then being applied to see how good a job the legislature did
in working from its purpose to the enactment of the law. I
recognize, however, that there is language in some of our cases
which can be read to support that sort of test. I also
disagree with the language in your opinion which seems to
restrict the ability of courts to uphold statutes ("purpose
may not be imagined," p. 11), and with other language which
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seems to expand their authority to strike statutes down
("distinction must be genuinely related to the state's
purpose," p. 13). I will swallow my objections, however,
if the resolution of this battle is by agreement to be
left for another day.
Because of all the internal exchanges that have
taken place in this case, I think that if we are to
agree on an opinion, and also to agree that the opinion
is not to be a definitive restatement of the Equal
Protection standard, that opinion ought to keep alive both
sides of the doctrinal dispute.
I can subscribe to an
opinion containing your "purpose" analysis, even though I
disagree with it, if you will include in some appropriate place
in the opinion a quotation with approval of the standards set
forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Admittedly this is inconsistent with your analysis, but it
will not be the first time that an Equal Protection opinion
has contained verbal inconsistencies.
If, on the other hand, you feel strongly that this is
a case in whichthe definitive reassessment ought to be made,
I cannot join your opinion as it now stands, and due to the
lateness in the Term I would be inclined to vote for
reargument.
Sincerely,

~~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,ju.prmtt

<!fouri of tqt 'Jnittb ~btfts

-.uftinghtn. ~. <!f.

2ll~~~
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 14, 1976

Re:

74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I remain of the view that McGowan v. Maryland is
the sound test. I agree with Byron's memo of June 9 that
federal judges are much confused and we owe an obligation
to clarify, not rewrite, the ground rules. A McGowan
reaffirmance will do that.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I
•

No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board v. MUrsia
'

'

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Here is a suggested Per Curiam that would dispose of
Murgia.

·

It . is about as blandly written as one can write to
dispose of the equal protection arguments advanced in this
case. It leaves, I think, each of us free to "fight again
another day" as to our respective perceptions of a proper
formulation of equal protection analysis.
. ,
Bill Brennan has seen this "bare-bones" draft, and
subject to one relatively minor change - he thinks he could
join it as a Per Curiam opinion. He does, however, have certain
reservations that he will mention at Thursday's Conference. ·
Bill is not disposed to join even this Per Curiam if other
Justices still wish to write. I have assured Bill my zeal
for writing has been so thoroughly dampened by this spring's
experience, that it may be sometime before l venture forth :,, .
again - although I suppose I will in due time.
,
Bill also bas Dukes in mind, and will discuss its posture
in light of what we decide to do about Murfia. A possibility
that I suggested to him is that we might d spose of Dukes in
very much the same way, by a Per CUriam that leaves all options
open. After all, Dukes is a "peewee".
.
~ own view is that there~is much to be said for our
·• · disposing of these cases rather than carrying them over for
futile reargument.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

'

t

L

~- 1-o ~ ~ ~J,. ~Lu ~
j;nprtmt {!ftrurl trf tlrt ~t~ j;tafts

~rutfrittgLm. ~. <!f. 2llc?~.;l
CHAM BER S OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 16, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
think you have done an admirable job at rewriting
this opinion to satisfy the maximum possible number of your
colleagues, and if you are willing to make two minor
changes which I think are completely consistent with your
own previous expressions on the subject, I shall be delighted
to climb aboard. On page 9, the first two sentences in
the paragraph beginning on that page now read:
I

"That the State chooses not to determine
fitness more precisely through individualized
testing after age 50 is not to say that
the State's
is not rationally furthered
by a maximum age imitation. ~J ls only
to say that with re ard to the interests of
all concerned, the
ate perhaps has not
chosen the
to accomplish its
purpose."

y
f

Would you be willing
bstitute for the phrase
"State's purpose" in the first sentence, the phrase "objective
of Iaximizing physical prepare ness", and to substitute
for ~"its" in the sec nd sentence the word "this".
I t ink the sentence as now w itten does not make adequate

~ ~~
'

'

'
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allowance for the concept of secondary purposes which the
legislature may have had in mind in enacting the statute,
and I gather from your response to my hypothetical about
the Virginia and West Virginia safety equipment statutes
that you fully agree that secondary purposes are relevant
in applying the standards you set forth.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copy to Mr. Justice

Stewart ~

J;u:p-rtmt <!fcurl cf t4t 'JI;lnitth J;tattg
Jfagltittghtn. !9. <!f. 2llbiJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 16, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

/

.ittpTtttu <!Joud of tqt ~nittb .itatta
~aafrittgbm.18. <!J. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 16, 1976

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board v. Murgia
Dear Lewis,
I agree with Bill Rehnquist' s suggested minor
verbal change and hope you will see fit to make it. I
would ask you also to delete the last sentence of fn. 8,
since I cannot agree that whether something is constitutional depends upon whether it is "reasonable't -- except
perhaps in the Fourth Amendment area.
If these very minor, and I hope noncontroversial,
changes are made, I shall gladly join your proposed Per
Curiam with no separate writing.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copy to Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

6/16/76
,
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Chris Whitman

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1976

'
After
this "circus" subsides with the end of the Term,

and if you can bring yourself ever again to think about MUrgia,
I would appreciate your putting our file in proper shape to

go downstairs for permanent filing.
Only you aa8 I possibly could be familiar with the
gyrations through which this miserable case has passed, and
sort out the drafts that should be retained (for a history
of its checkered career) from those that are duplicates, or
otherwise may be discarded.
I particularly want the correspondence file to be complete,

and in order.

Also,

w~

should have a copy of each of the

various circulations.
And, before you depart (sad thought!), please put my
"· "equal protection" notebook in shape, including such Murgia
data as you think appropriate.
Maybe you will need a tranquilizeD before undertaking
this task.

Perhaps Beckie can provide you with one!

L.F.P., Jr.
as

.

.

..

.iu.prtutt Q}O'Urlltf tlrt ~tb ~bdts
-ulfinghm. ~. <If. 2llgt~'
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 16, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.iu:pTtmt (lfourt of tqt ~ttittb .imttg
~agftinghm. ~.

"f.

211gt~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 17, 1976

/

Re: No. 74-1044, Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join the per curiam you have circulated
in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u:p-rtnu ~onrl

ttf tqt 1Jtttitt~ ~fiifig
~agltht¢tllt, ;!B. ~· 20.;tJ!..;J

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June l 7, l 9 7 6

/
Re:

No. 74-l 044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Mur ia

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in the per curiam circulated June 15.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

•.·,,"'

,ju:.prtutt ~qttri l1f tlrt ~~ ,jtaftg
:.u4htghtn. ~. ~· 2ll~,.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

June 1 7, 1 9 7 6

74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia

Dear Lewis:
I join your per curiam of June 15.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
)(r.

Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Blaokmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquiat
Justice Stevena

From: Kr. Justice Marshall
Circulated:----Reciroula ted: . \UN

2nd DRAJT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:Im
No, 74-1044
Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.
v.
Robert D. Murgia.
[April -, 1976]
MR. JuSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
Today the Court holds that it is permissible for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to declare that members of its state police force who have been proven medically fit for service are nonetheless legislatively unfit to
be policemen and must be terminated-involuntarily "retired"-because they have reached the age of 50. Although we have called the right to work "of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it
was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), the Court )
finds that the right to work is not a fundamental right.
And, while agreeing that "the treatment of the aged in
this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination,"
ante, a.t 6, the Court holds that the elderly are not a suspect class. Accordingly, the Court undertakes the scrutiny mandated by the bottom tier of its two-tier equal
protection framework, finds the challenged legislation /
not to be "wholly unrelated" to its objective ~ and holds,
therefore, that it survives equal protection attack. l re~
spectfully dissent.
I
Although there are signs that its grasp on the law is:
weakening, the rigid twa-tier model still holds sway as.
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the Court's articulated description of' the equal protection
test. Again, I must object to its perpetuation. The
model's two fixed modes of analysis, strict scrutiny and
mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the
Court has undertaken-or should undertake-in equal
protection cases. Rather, the inquiry has been much
more sophisticated and the Court should admit as much.
It has focused upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted
in support of the classification. Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-433 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dis~
senting); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
.Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U . S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (MAR~
SHALL, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471 , 519-530 (1970) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). See
also City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Firefighters,- U. S.
- , --, slip op., at 3 (1976); Memorial Hospital v..
Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 253-254 (1974); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335 (1972); Kramer v.
Union School Dist., 395 U. S. 621 , 626 ( 1969); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
Although the Court outwardly adheres to the two-tier
model, it has apparently lost interest in recognizing further "fundamental" rights and "suspect" classes. See
San Antonio School District v. .Rodriguez, supra (re ...
jecting education as a fundamental right); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) (declining to treat
women as a suspect class) . In my view, this result is
the natural consequence of the limitations of the Court's
traditional equal protection analysis. If a statute invades a "fundamental" right or discriminates against a
1
'suspect," class, it is subject to strict .scrutiny. If a stat...
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· ute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or
nearly always, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S.
r 214 ( 1944)' is struck down.
Quite obviously, the only
critical decision is whether strict scrutiny should be invoked at all. It should be no surprise, then, that the
Court is hesitant to expand the number of categories of
rights and classes subject to strict scrutiny, when each
expansion involves the invalidation of virtually every
classification bearing upon a newly covered category. 1
But however understandable the Court's hesitancy to
mvoke strict scrutiny, all remaining legislation should
not drop into the bottom tier, and be measured by the
mere rationality test. For that test, too, when applied
as articulated, leaves little doubt about the outcome;
the challenged legislation is always upheld. See New
Orleans v. Dukes, U. S. (1976) (overruling
Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 ( 1957), the only modern
case in which this Court has struck down an economic
classification as irrational). It cannot be gainsaid that
there remain rights, not now classified as "fundamental,"
that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and
classes, not now classified as "suspect," that are unfairly
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the
individual worth of their members. Whatever we call
1

1 Some classifications are so inv1dious that they should be struck
down automatically absent the most compelling state intere::>t, and
by suggesting the limitations of strict srruti11y analysis I do not
mean to imply otherwise. The analysis should be accomplished,
however, not by stratified notions of "suspect" classes and "fundamental" rights, but by individualized asset>sments of the partiCular
classes and nghts involved in each case. Of course, the traditional
suspect classes and fundamental rights would still rank at the top
of the list of protected categories, so that in cases involving those·
eategones analysis would be functionally eqmvalent to stnct scrutmy.
Thus, the advantages of the approach I favor do not appPar in such
eases, but rat1wr <'merge in those dealing w1th traditionally less;
r.rotcctPd. classes and. rights. See pp. 5-13, infra

·.
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these rights and classes, we simply cannot forgo all ju~
dicial protection against discriminatory legislation bearing upon them, but for the rare instances when the legislative choice can be termed "wholly irrelevant" to the
legislative goal. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
425 (1961) ,
While the Court's traditional articulation of the rational basis test does suggest just such an abdication, hap-pily the Court's deeds have not matched its words. Time
and again, met with cases touching upon the prized
rights an,d burdened classes of our society, the Court
has acted only after a reasonably probing look at the
legislative goals and means, and at the significance of
the personal rights and interests invaded. Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 tJ. S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); United States Dept. of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973); Frontiero v. Richard-~
son, 411 U. S., at 691 (PowELL, J., concurring in the
judgment); James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S.
164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). See San An,..
tonio School Disftrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 98110 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 2 These cases make clear
that the Court has rejected, albeit sub silentio, its most
deferential statements of the rationality standard in
·assessing the validity under the Equal Protection Clause
·of much noneconomic legislation,
But there are problems with deciding cases based on
factors not encompassed by the applicable standards.
First, the approach is rudderless, affording no notice to
interested parties of th~ standards governing particular
See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword :
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court : A Model for .a.
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev . l (1972) .
2

. .·

.... ·
.

..
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74-1044-DISSENT
MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

5

cases and giving no firm guidance to judges who, as a
consequence, must assess the constitutionality of legisla,..
tion before them on an ad hoc basis. Second, and not
unrelatedly, the approach is unpredictable and requires
holding this Court to standards it has never publicly
adopted. Thus, the approach presents the danger that, as
I suggest has happened here, relevant factors will be
misapplied or ignored. All interests not "fundamental"
and all classes not "suspect" are not the same; and it is
time for the Court to drop the pretense that, for pur·
poses of the Equal Protection Clause, they are.

II
The danger of the Court's verbal adherence to the rigid
two-tier test, despite its effective repudiation of that test
in the cases, is demonstrated by its efforts here. There is
simply no reason why a statute that tells able-bodied
police officers, ready and willing to work, that they no
longer have the right to earn a living in their chosen
profession merely because they are 50 years old should
be judged by the same minimal standards of rationality
that we use to test economic legislation that discrimi~
nates against business interests. See New Orleans v.
Dukes, supra; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483 (1955). Yet, the Court today not only ilFokes th~
minimal level of scrutiny, it wrongly adheres to it. Analysis of the three factors I have identified above-the
importance of the governmental benefits denied, the char..
acter of the class, and the asserted state interests~
demonstrates the Court's error.
Whether "fundamental" or not, "the right of the indi..
vidual .. . to engage in any of the common occupations
of life" has been repeatedly recognized by this Court as
falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the·
Fourteenth Amendment, Board of Regents v. Roth, 40~

74-1044-DISSENT
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U. S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262'
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). As long ago as the Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Bradley wrote that this right "is an
inalienable right; it was formulated as such under theo
phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence . . . . This right is a large ingredient in the
civil liberty of the citizen." 111 U. S. 746, 762 (1884)
(concurring opinion). And in Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S.
630 (1914), in invalidating a law that criminally penalized anyone who served as a freight train conductor without having previously served as a brakeman, and that·
thereby excluded numerous equally qualified employees
from that position, the Court recognized that "all men
are entitled to the equal protection of the law in their
right to work for the support of themselves and families."
ld., at 641.
"In so far as a man is deprived of the right to•
labor his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn
wa~s and acquire property is lessened, and he is·
denied the protection which the law affords those··
who are permitted to work. Liberty means more ·
than freedom from servitude, and the constitutional
guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be .
protected in the right to use his powers of mind and'
body in any lawful calling." !d., at 636.
See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 40Z
U. S. 535 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U. S. 589, 605-606 (1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238-239 (1957); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S., at 41. Even if the right to earn a living does
not include the right to work for the government/ it is;
a s ee BwrtiH oj Rei'!11bfs '\(.. Bot'h,.. 40S: U. S. 56A, 587 (1972.)'>
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settled that because of the importance of the interest
involved, we have always carefully looked at the reasons
a.sserted for depriving a government employee of his job.
While depriving any government employee of his job
is a significant deprivation, it is particularly burdensome
when the person deprived is an older citizen. Once terminated, the elderly cannot readily find alternative employment. The lack of work is not only economically
damaging, but emotionally and physically draining.
Deprived of his status in the community anq of the
opportunity for meaningful activity, fearful of becoming
dependent on others for his support, and lonely in his
new-found isolation, the involuntarily retired person is
susceptible to physical and emotional ailments as a
direct consequence of his enforced idleness.. . Ample
clinical evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory
retirement poses a direct threat to the healtp and life
expectancy of the retired person/ and these cons!:lquences
of termination for age are not disputed by appellant.
Thus, an older person deprived of his job by the government loses not only his right to earn a living, but, too
often, his health as well, in sad contradiction of Browning's promise, "The best is yet to be/ The la.St of life,
for which the first was made." 5
Not only are the elderly denied important benefits
when they are terminated on the basis of age, but the
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). Appellee makes no such plaim; nor {
does he allege that procedural due process requires that he be af8
forded a hearing prior to termination .
4
See American Medical Assn. (AMA) Comm. on Aging, Retirement, A Medical Philosophy and Approach; M. Barron, The Aging
American 76-86, and sources cited ( 1961) . Because, as one former
AMA president bluntly put it, "Death comes at retirement," quoted
in M. Barron, supra, at 76, the AMA has formally taken a position
against involuntary retirement and has submitted an amicus brief
in this case to inform us of the medical consequences of the practice.
~ R. }l{ownin::, Rabbi Ben Ezra, St. l
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classification of older workers is itself one that merits
judicial attention. Whether older workers constitute a
"suspect" class or not, it cannot be disputed that they
eonstitute a Class subject to repeated and arbitrary discrimination in employment. See U. S. Dept. of Labor,
The Older American Worker : Age Discrimination in
Employment (1965); M. Barron, The Aging Arfterican
55-68 (1961). As Congress found in passing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967,
'
"[I] n the face of rising productivity and affiuence,
older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their
efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs[.]
"[T]he setting of arbitrary age limits reg~dle8s
of potential for job performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older
persons[.]
"[T] he incidence of unemployment, especially
long-term unemployment with resultant deteriora. tion of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave[ .]" 29 U. S. C. § 621
(subsection numbers omitted) .
See also ante, at 10 n. 1.
Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that
disinctions exist between the ·elderly and traditional suspect classes such as Negroes, and between the elderly and
"quasi-suspect" classes such as women or illegitimates.
The elderly are protected not only by certain anti-discrimination legislation, but by legislation that provides
them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the public at
large. Moreover, the elderly are not isolated in society,
and discrimination against them is not pervasive but is
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centered primarily in employment. The advants,ge of a
flexible equal protection standard, however, is that it can
readily accommodate such variables. The elderly are
undoubtedly discriminated against, and when legislation
denies them an important benefit-employment-! conclude that to sustain the legislation the Commonwealth
must show a reasonably substantial interest and a
scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that interest. Cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U. S., at 124-126 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). This
inquiry, ultimately, is not markedly different from that
undertaken by the Court in Reed v. Reed, supra.
Turning, then, to the Commonwealth's arguments, I
agree that the purpose of the mandatory retirement law
is legitimate, and indeed compelling. The Commonwealth has every reason to assure that its state police
officers are of sufficient physical strength and health to
perform their jobs. In my view,· however, the means
chosen, the forced retirement of officers at age 50, is so
overinclusive that it must fall.
All potential officers must pass a rigorous physical examination. Until age 40, this same examination must bepassed every two years-when the officer re-enlists-and,.
a.fter age 40, every year. The Commonwealth has conceded that "[w]hen a member passes his re-enlistment
or annual physical, he is found to be qualified to perform all of the duties of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police." App. 43. See App. 52.
lf a member fails the examination, he is immediately terminated or refused re-enlistment. Thus, the only mem·bers of the state police still on the force at age 50 are'
those who have been determined-repeatedly-by the
'Commonwealth to be physica.lly fit for the job. Yet, alr
of these physically fit officers are automatically termi-·
·nated a.t age 50. The Commonwealth does not.
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seriously assert that its testing is no longer effective
at age 50,6 nor does it claim that continued testing would
serve no purpose because officers over 50 are no longer
physically able to perform their jobs. 7 Thus the Commonwealth is in the position of already individually testing its police officers for physical fitness, conceding that
such testing it adequate to determine the psysical ability
There may be an age at which passing a physical examination
provides no substantial guarantee that the officer is fit for service
for the coming yea.r. In that case, the test has lost its predictive
ability. There is no showing that age 50 marks such a linealthough the Commonwealth asks us to hypothesize that it doesand indeed the evidence seems contrary to that supposition. First,
among officers aged 40-49, who undergo yearly examinations, there
is no general trend of increasing rejections with age nor any suggestion that those who passed the examination served in less than a satisfactory manner. Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement,
376 F . Supp. 753,756 (Mass. 1974) .
This evidence presents no reason to assume that testing suddenly
loses its predictive ability after age 50. The only relevant. studies
presented are contrary to the Commonwealth's assumption. These
studies support the conclusion that airline pilots should be terminated at age 60 bec.o'\use after that age medical examinations lose
their predictive ability. See Air Line Pilots Assn., Int'l v. Quesada,
276 F. 2d 892 (CA2 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) ,
The suggestion that a.ge 50 is not the critical point for predictive
ability is also supported by the national experience. Appellee has
produced a study of the laws of the 50 States that shows that
Massachusetts' 50-year-old retirement law IS the lowest in the
Nation, and that no other State requires its state police to retire
before age 55. Brief for Appellee, 37 n. 14.
In short, I refuse to hypothesize that testing after age 50 loses
its predictive ability when the Commonwealth has introduced absolutely nothing that supports this position.
7 Indeed, the Commonwealth has conceded that "[a]ny individual
member of the Uniformed Branch ... whose age is 50 years or more
may be capable of performing the physical activity required of the
Uniformed Branch ... depending upon his individual physical con~
~dition. " App, 44. See App. 52,
0
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of an officer to continue on the job, and conceding that
that ability may continue after age 50. In these circumstances, I see no reason at all for automatically terminating those officers who reach the age of 50; indeed,
that action seems the height of irrationality.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Commonwealth's
mandatory retirement law cannot stand when measured
against the significant deprivation the Commonwealth's
action works upon the terminated employees. I would
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 8

8 The Court's conclusion today does not imply that all mandatory
retirement laws are constitutionally valid. Here the primary state
interest is in maintaining a physically fit police force, not a mentally
alert or manually dexterous workforce. That the Court concludes
it is rational to legislate on the assumption tha.t physical strength
and well-being decrease significantly with age does not imply that
it will reach the same conclusion with respect to legislation based
on assumptions about mental or manual ability. Accordingly, a
mandatory retirement law for all government. employees would stand
in a :posture different ftom the law before u.s today.
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SUPBEME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~,
No. 74-1044
Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.
v.
Robert D. Murgia.
[February -, 1976]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum.
This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uni~
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment,1
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides:
41
Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides:
1
' (a) ... Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter

••

J

•
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3)(a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two . . . who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
"(b) Any ... officer ... who has performed service ... for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
'performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp . .(ED La,
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff"g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1913). Our
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974).
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti·tuate. a .viohttion of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim

..
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972), On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
sublr).itted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
,interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup~
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U. S. C. § 621 et Meq.

74-1044-MEMO
4

MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between a.ging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performingstress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174--176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness·
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would'
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for ·
!t. determined that the age classification established by-

r•
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis·
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre·
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.

I
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)~
reaffirm!')d that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative Classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect c1ass. 4 Mandatory retirement at age 5()
a E . g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to·
vote) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel ..
Williamson , 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) .
4 E . g., ·Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v.
California, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) .

t'
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neitheJ'
~ituation.

The requirement implicates no fundamental right of
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun~
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ...
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
/d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and
although due process procedural safeguards are often
required as a condition to termination of government
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 ( 1973),
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 ( 1972),
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 ( 1959) ,S the Court's
'decisions give no support to the prop~ition that the
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employment per se. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly,
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legis...
lation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
'over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
5

Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in.

'\he action of the R.etirement Board.
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have
had a high degree of success in making the political
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re·
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dm.
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C.§ 62i
et seq.,· Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C.
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding
age discrirnination, 6 including Massachusetts. 7 The participation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly, 8
6 E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y.

Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
Art. 6252-14 (1970).
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A.
Indeed, appellee asserts
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimination. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61.
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975);
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974); Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and JanuaryMarch 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate
Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Governors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973).
As appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including:

,..

74-1044--MEMO

8
'

MASSACHUSETI'S BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

including age discrimination, demonstrate that the trad!-:
tional political processes have not foundered where interests of the aged are at stake. 9
There is no indication in any of our cases, howeverl
that evidence of high numerical representation in the
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group tha~
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treat...
ment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemption from categorization as a suspect class based on the
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could penalize those who properly seek legislative rather than
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It also
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that
few would contend is no longer in need of the special protection envisioned for them by the drafters of the FourMassachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment is one of favorable concern:
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and.
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and
needs, regardless of age." Brief for Appellee, at 00.
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974) , which sustained a
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational benefits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal protection, stated :
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to subject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale·
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the·
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political
~rocesses may have broken clown." !d., at 3'Z5 n. 14.
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
u.s. 303 (1880).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination,lQ such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truely indicative of their abilities. When those factors are present, there is reason to
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about
group characteristics that have no place in our constitutional system.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50.
It cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs.
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker:
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age:
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium : Law and the Aged, VT
A:r.iz.. L. Rev. 267 (1975) .

.
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterizeq
11s "strict judicial scrutiny."

II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rei~
11tively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid. 11 Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively valid.
legislative classifications must have substance if the
Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning.
Although the language used to formulate the rational
basis standard or test has varied/ 2 more recently we have:
indicated that a State's classification does not create an
.invidious discrimination where it rationally furthers some
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio•
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17.
11 See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). This presumption is particularly strong in areas of economics, taxation, and
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. See, e. g., Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S ..
78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 484.
12 The variety of our formulations and their application has
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds
a number of creative ideas. E . g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court 1
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 Va . L. Rev. 945 (1975).

"'·\!·
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Identification of the state purpose normally presents
little difficulty. We do require that the purpose be
capable of discernment by some means short of hypothe ..
sizing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation
concerning the constitutionality of the statute. See, e. g.,
U. S. D. A. v. M arena, 413 U. S. 528, 536-538 ( 1973);
NlcGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 270 (1973). That
is, it must either be articulated by the legislature, apparent from the legislative history, or clearly implicit in the
statutory scheme. 13 The great deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled
under this scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the
political process is most sensitive to the wishes of the
people in a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow
from this assumption, however, that it is appropriate for
a court to devise or imagine policy where none has been
indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the
action taken. The proper functioning of the political
process is best served where the State bears the responsibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is
enacted against such a background, the Court has some
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem and also that its decision has received a public air13 This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legislative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is helpful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly
apparent from the face of the enactment. Substantial weight'
may be given to the contemporaneous interpretation by the administrative or executive agencies charged with a statute's enforcement.
But where interpretation by administrative or executive agencies
occurs first in the course of litigation care must be taken that such
interpretation is not in effect hypothesizing by a lawyer.
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ing. 14 In such circumstances, deference to the decision
of the State is not only appropriate, but required by the
demands of our democratic system.
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest
that the Court is required to engage in a substantive review of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed,
an inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distinguish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement
that a State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of powers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not
14 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing·
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
44 (1972). The principle that the Equal Protection Clause should'
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York,.
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring):
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand·,
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the sub-·
ject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation·
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine·
that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise powers
so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation . This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of ·
the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there ·
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed ·
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the ·
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure ·
that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in t
operation."

.
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i11dependently violate other constitutional requirements.
At the same time, the State's purpose asserted as justifying the classification must not be illusory, a mere facade
concealing the existence of an objective that is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See U. S. D. A. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410
u. s. 263, 276 ( 1973).
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50,
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring
the physical prepa.redness of its uniformed police.15 The
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582,
at 8 (1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police}
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939) , Mass. Acts &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 21, 23-25 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by th~
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware V;
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be
served nor disputes its legitimacy.16
Once an identifiable legitimate state purpose has been
discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the relationship that the challenged classification bears to that purpose. Indeed, this is usually the primary inquiry, as
in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily identifiable.
The making of value judgments as to the wisdom or desirability of legislative purposes is not within the role
of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed to attain a purpose, the grouping or classification of persons,
presents the focal point of inquiry under equal protection
analysis. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 ( 1972). The test under
this standard of review is not whether the means
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means
may have achieved the legislative purpose; rather, the
test is whether the means chosen are rational and bear
"a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Roy- .
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 1
Although the need for legislative accommodations must
be respected, the distinctions made by a classification
must be genuinely related to the State's purpose in en1
acting the legislation in question. Thus, in Johnson v.
Robison, 415 u'. S., at 382-383, we found it significant
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retir&ment ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975).
16 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23.
The identification of this objective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not consider the further assertion that the retirement plan also promotes the ·
S_tat.e!s- intet:est in P.roviding economic security for its employees~.
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that the "inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate
governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups
would not." See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715,
723-730 (1972). 17
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective. 18 There is no indication
that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
statute. 19
17 Of course, the relationship may not be trivial or illogical,
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and
may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose.
18 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this
difference that renders the different employxpent requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
lU Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the

.. ~
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That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is. only to say
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose. 20 But where rationality is the test, a
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
·psychological effects premature and compulsory retirement can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 21 But "[w]e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at '7 (1955).
20 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examinations through age 50, appellee ·would concede the rationality of man·datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduetion of individual examinations, 'however, hardly defeats the
·rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by e:ven
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
21 E . g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu·roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d'
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging,.
Developments in Aging: '1971 and January~March ' 1972, S. Rep ..
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the IndiVidual of the Senate Special
·committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts.l & 2, 36-46, 87-10~
'1.71.:-1,;27, 212-21.7, 464-471. (1967).

'•
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objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
or th~:~-t a more just and humane system could not be devised." /d., at 487. We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the 1aw.

The judgment is reverBed.

Ma. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et at,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts,
Robert D, Murgia.
[May - , 1976]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum.
This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uniformed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment,1
Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persGns and property and for the
maintenance of law and order m the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides :
" (a) •.. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of cha,Pter
1
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the -District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the· laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 · The District Judge dis..
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer ... who has performed service .. . for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
"50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La.
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
·933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 41.5 U. S. 986 (1974),
dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976) ; Edelman v.
.Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974) .
2
Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to constitl,l.a,te a ~iola~ion of 42 U. S. C. § !983. Appellee roa«1e ~o claim
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974) . We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975) . We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,.
arduous." 376 F . Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1961,.
29 U. S. C. § 621 et Meq.
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
'uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at a.ge 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, inCluding an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and menta:l
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to ·the
physiological arid psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship- between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi·
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police·
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of -the group.
'Appendix, at 77-18, 174--176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over"50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of unifoifmed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed numoer of studies. Id., at 17-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 ( 1969), for·
"it determined that the age classification established ~by·

.

·.~

•..
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.

I
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. 4 Mandatory retirement at age 50
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) .
1 E . g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage') ;
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race'); Oyama w.
Califorma, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) .
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
situation.
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fundamental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ...
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.''
!d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in
· the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity · that
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and
although due process procedural safeguards are often
required as a condition to termination of government.
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1973),
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972),
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 5 the Court's
.decisions give no ·support' to the prop08ition· that the
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employment per se. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Ac~ordingly,
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability ·of employment ·opportunities." Dandndge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the · class of uniformed ~tate police officers
' over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedutal 'due process in
'the action of the Retirement ~rd .
5

.
'
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have
had a high degree of success in making the political
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re·
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dis·
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 62i
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C.
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding
age discrimination, 6 including Massachusetts.7 The participation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly, 8
6 E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y.
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1971}-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1971}-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.

Art. 6252-14 (1970).
7 Mass. Gen . Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimination. As to determinations under § 26 (3)(a), however, he makes
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61.
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975);
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974); Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and JanuaryMarch 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate
Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement . of the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Governors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973).
Ail appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including
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including age discrimination, demonstrate that the tradi ..
tional political processes have not foundered where interests of the aged are at stake.9
There is no indication in any of our cases, howeve,r,
that evidence of high numerical representation in the
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial
'legislation is alone sufficient ·to .remove a group th&t
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treat,.
ment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemp,.
tion from categorization as a suspect class based on the
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could pe,..
nalize those who properly seek legislative rather than
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It a1s()
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that
few would contend is no longer in need of the special protection envisioned for them by the drafters of the Four~
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment is one of favorable concern:
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and
needs, regardless of age:)) Brief for Appellee, at ~0.
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), which sustained a
federal legislative classification denyin~ Veterans' educational benefits to conscientious objectors a~ainst a claim: of denial of equal protection, stated :
"Given the solicitous regard that ·congress has manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presUlnptuous of a court to subject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditienal political
:processes may have broken -down." J.d., at 375 n. 14.
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
u.s. 303 (1880).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination,' 0 such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truely indicative of their abilities. When those factors are present, there is reason to
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that.
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about
group characteristics that have no place in our constitutional system.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature·
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state·
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it.
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs..
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker :
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age:
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium: !Law and t'he A,ged, .ll'.i'
Aria. L. Rev. 267 (1975} .

'·
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subje9t
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judicial scrutiny."

II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
. at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid. 11 Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively valid
legislative classifications must have substance if the
Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning.
Although the language used to formulate the r~tional
basis standard or test has varied/ 2 more recently we have
indicated that a State's classification does not create an
invidious discrimination where it rationally furthers some
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17.
1 l See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83; 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). This pte!i\Imption is particularly ~trong in areas of economics, taxation, and
allocation of necessarily limited state resources . See, e. g., Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 484.
12 The variety of our formulations and their application has
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds
a number of creative ideas. E . g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
the Equrtl Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975) .
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Identification of the state purpose normally presents
little difficulty. We do require that the purpose be
capable of discernment by some means short of hypothesizing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation
concerning the constitutionality of the statute. See, e. g.,
U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 536--538 (1973);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 270 (1973). That
is, it must either be articulated by the legislature, apparent from the legislative history, or clearly implicit in the
statutory scheme. 13 The great deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled
under this scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the
political process is most sensitive to the wishes of the
people in a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow
from this assumption, however, that it is appropriate for
a court to devise or imagine policy where none has been
indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the
action taken. The proper functioning of the political
process is best served where the State bears the responsibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is
enacted against such a background, the Court has some
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem and also that its decision has received a public air13 This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legislative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is helpful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly
apparent from the face of the enactment. Substantial weight
may be given to the contemporaneous interpretation by the administrative or executive agencies charged with a statute's enforcement.
But where interpretation by administrative or executive agencies
occurs first in the course of litigation care must be taken that sucb
interpretation is not in effect hypothesizing by a lawyer.
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ingY In such circumstances, deference to the decision
of the State is not only appropriate, but required by the
demands of our democratic system.
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest
·that the Court is required to engage in a substantive review of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed,
an inquiry of this sort is one of the ·factors that distinguish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement
that a State's purpose be 11 legitimate" indicates only that
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of powers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not
14

See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
44 (1972). The principle that the Equal Protection Clause should
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson,· J., concurring):
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand,
does not disable any governmental body from 'dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or ·regulation
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine
that cities, states :md the Federal Government must exercise powers
so as not to discriminate between 'their inhabitants except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of
the Constitution knew, and we should not forget · today, that there
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retnbution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure ·
that laws will be just than to :tequire that. laws be eq).lal im
operation.~'·
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independently violate other constitutional requirements.
At the same time, the State's purpose asserted as justifying the classification must not be illusory, a mere facade
concealing the existence of an objective that is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See U. S. D. A. v.
M arena, 413 U. S. 528 ( 1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410
u.s. 263,276 (1973).
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50,
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 15 The
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in ail
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to
demonstrate that men above mirldle life are not usuaily physicaily
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582,
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." Id., at 8. The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. Id., at 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specificaily proposed by the
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 2'1, 23-25 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by the
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ( 1960); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 ( 1957). Appellee
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be
served nor disputes its legitimacy.' 6
Once an identifiable legitimate state purpose has been
discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the relationship that the challenged classification bears to that purpose. Indeed, this is usually the primary inquiry, as
in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily identifiable.
The making of value judgments as to the wisdom or desirability of legislative purposes is not within the role
of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed to attain a purpose, the grouping or classification of persons,
presents the focal point of inquiry under equal protection
analysis. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a. Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). The test under
this standard of review is not whether the means
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means
may have achieved the legislative purpose; rather, the
test is whether the means chosen are rational and bear
"a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 ( 1920).
Although the need for legislative accommodations must
be respected, the distinctions made by a classification
must be genuinely related to the State's purpose in enacting the legislation in question. Thus, in Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U. S., at 382-383, we found it significant
State's max1mum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retirement ages for lass dt>manding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966) , as amended (Supp. 1975).
10 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23.
The identification of this objective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not consider the further assertion that the retirement plan also promotes the
State's interest in providmg economic security for its employees.
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that the "inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate
governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups
would not." See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715,
723-730 (1972) .17
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective. 18 There is no indication
that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
statute. 19
17 Of course, the relationship may not Be trivial or illogical,
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and
may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose.
18 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this
difference that renders the different employment requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
19 Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise ther
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That the St~te chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furth~red by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say
that with regar~ to the intel"ests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chos~m the best means to accomplish its purpose. 20 But where rationality is the test, a
statute "does not ~violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classjfications made by '[it] are imperfect." Dandrid_ge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the supstantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retirement can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 21 But " [ w] e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955).
2 0 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examinations through age 50, appeilee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least ·as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
21 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging: 1971 and Januacy-March 1972, S. Rep.
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46,87-101,
l l21-127,.21Z...:217, 464--471 (1967).
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Qbjectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
pr that a mor.e just and humane system could not be de~
vised." !d. , at 487. We decide only that the system
~nacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.

The judgment i8 reversed.

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera•
tion ·or decision of this case.
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Massachusetts Board of
Retirement et al.,
On Appeal from the United
Appellants,
States District Court for the
District
of Massachusetts.
v.
Robert D. Murgia.
[May -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum.
This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uniformed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
1

---·------

Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer .. .."
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides :
41
(a) •. . Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter

1976
--·--·----
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 yrars of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' serviCe.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La,,
1975) ; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those cases dO<'s not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to cons1der more fully that question. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974).
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C .
§-§ 2201 , 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to constituate a vi.olati.on of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment a.nd remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Qf 196'Z,,
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.

74-1044-MEMO
4

MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for
'it. determined that the age classification established by
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.

I
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 8 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.4 Mandatory retirement at age 50
E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstaJe travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate).
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); O·yama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) .
3
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The requirement implicates no fundamental right of
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun'"
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right . ..
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
!d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and
although due process procedural safeguards are often
required as a condition to termination of government
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1973),
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972),
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 5 the Court's
decisions give no support to the proposition that the
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employ~
ment per se. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 ( 1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly,
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legis~
iation restricting the availability of employment op~
portunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class fot purposes of equai
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
~ Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedtiral due process in
the action of the Retirement Board.
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have
had a high degree of success in making the political
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Reform Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.; Age Dis~
.crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C.
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding
age discrimination, 6 including Massachusetts. 7 The participation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly, 8
E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y.
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
Art. 6252-14 (1970) .
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann . c. 149, § 24A.
Indeed, appellee asserts
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)
{a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimination. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes
no such oontention. Brief for Appellee, at 59-61.
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975);
Senate Special Commit,tee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and JanuaryMarch 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Senate
Special Committee on Aging, DevelopmE'nts in Aging: 1971 and
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Governors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of
Massachusetts Elderly ( 1971) ; Special Report of the Retirement
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) .
As appellee recognizes, the· actual attitude of legislatures, including
6
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including age discrimination, demonstrate that the tr:adi.
tional political processes have not foundered where interests of the aged are at stake. 9
There is no indication in any of our cases, however,
that evidence of high numerical representation in the
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group that
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treatment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemption from categorization as a suspect class based on the
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could penalize those who properly seek legislative rather than
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It also
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that
few would contend is no longer in need of the special protection envisioned for them by the drafters of the FourMassachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment is one of favorable concern:
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and
needs, regardless of age. 11 Brief for Appellee, at 60.
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational benefits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal protection, stated:
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to subject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the
presumption of constitutionafity fades because traditional political
processes may have broken down.''' I d., at 375 n 14,
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not.
been wholly free of discrimination/ 0 such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a.
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truely indicative of their abilities. When those factors are present, there is reason to
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about
group characteristics that have no place in our constitutional system.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature·
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50.
It cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it.
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to•
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it.
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those·
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly·
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs.
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older Amencan Worker:
Age Disrrimination in Employment (1965) ; Comment, 41 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age:
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium: Law and the Ag~d, ]'Z'
Aiiiz. L. Rev. 267 (1915) ..
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict j udicia1 scrutiny."

II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid. 11 This presumption is particularly strong in areas
of economics, taxation, and allocation of necessarily
limited state resources. See, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney,
1./~~V· r~,
406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,
1/IJ- u.s. s- l--f/
81 (1971). Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively
valid legislative classifications must have substan~e if 1 J 5'31 (If'").
the Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning. ~
Although the language used to formulate the rational
basis standard or test has varied, 12 we have indicated 1
that a State's classification does not create an invidious discrimination where it rationally furthers some
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17. Our
11 See, e. g., San Antonio School Distnct v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co ., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
12 The variPty of our forrpulations and their application has
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds
a number of crpative ideal:!. E. g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
the Equrrl Protection Clause, and the ThrPP Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975).
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inquiry under this test is concerned with the purpose
of the particular classification under challenge, rather
than with the overall purpose of the legislation as a
whole. And, of course, the classification may further
more than one legislative purpose. Identification of the
state purpose or purposes normally presents little difficulty. Although the purpose may not be imagined, it
usually is apparent from the face
the statute and its
legislative history. 18
L~
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest
that the Court is required to engage in a substantive review of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed,
an inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distinguish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement
that a State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of powers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not
independently violate other constitutional requirements.
At the same time, the State's purpose or purposes asserted
as justifying the classification must not be illusory, a mere

ob

13 Of course, ascertainment of purpose by a state court should
be respected, and substantial weight also should be given to the
interpretation by the administrative or executive agency charged
with a statute's enforcement.
We do note that the proper functioning of the political process
usually is best served where the policies or objectives of the legislature are identified at the time of enactment. When legislation is
rnacted against such a background, there is greater assurance that
the legislature has focused on the proble~
~ Gunther, In Search of Evo'!Ving Doctrmr on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
44 (1972). See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U. . 106, 112-113 (1949) (.Jackson, J., concurring) .

.
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facade concealing the existence of an objective that is
illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See U.S. D. A. v.
Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 ( 1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263. 276 ( 1973).
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50,
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 15 The
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Policr, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582,
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." !d., at R. The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to sperm! ,stud~· . their solr reason for not recommending age 45
being the antiripated pen;:ion costs to the State, not the reasonableness of thr age with rr;;pect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9.
Though t hr agt' 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the
commission. but was ultimatrly enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12,1939, c. 503, §3 (1939), Mass. Acts &
Rcso]vet; 7:37-738. it is apparent that the purpost' of the limitation
was to protect tht' public b~· assuring tht' ability of State Police to
reRpond to thr demandR of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, ttt 16, 17 (1967); Mass. LPg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This pnrpost' is also clearly implied by the
State's maximum-age schemr. which set;.; h1gher mandatory retirement ageR for ]a;:s dt>manding jobs. See Ma:ss. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. ·197~).
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiner8, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be
served nor disputes its legitimacy. 16
Once one or more identifiable legitimate state purposes
have been discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the
relatiouship that the challenged classification bears to
those purposes. Indeed, this is usually the primary inquiry, as in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily
identifiable. The making of value judgments as to the
wisdom or desirability of legislative purposes is not within
the role of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed
to attain a purpose, the rationality of the grouping or cl~
sification of persons, presents the focal point of inquiry under equal protection analysis. The test under the rational
basis standard of review is not whether the means
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means
may have achieved the legislative purpose. SeeMat hews
v. Lucas, - U. S. (June -, 1976). Rather, the
test is whether the means chosen bears "a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Royster Guano Co,
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Estelle
v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 539 (1975); Johnson v. Robi~
son, 415 U. S., at 374-375. Although the need for legis.
lative accommodations must be respected, the distinctions made must be genuinely related to the State's
purpose. Thus, in Johnson v. Robison, id., at 382-383,
we found it significant that the "inclusion of one group
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the
16
Brief for Appellee, at 20--23. The identification of this objective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not consider the further assertion that the retiremC'nt plan also promotes the
State's ~nterest in providing economic security for its employees.
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addition of other groups would not." See also Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 723-730 (1972). 17
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective. 18 There is no indication
that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in.fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
·statute.l. 9
1 7 Of coursP, the relationship may not be trivial or illogical,
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and
·may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose.
u Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
'Gen. Laws Ann . c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
· The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
·other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this
' difference that renders the different employment requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
10 Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No 2500, at 7 (1955).

v
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That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose. 20 But where rationality is the test, a
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retirement can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 21 But " [ w] e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina-tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
2 1 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep.
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972) ; Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101,
121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967) .
20
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or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.
The judgment is reversed.

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS
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This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uniformed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides:
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process.,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides :
·" (a) •.. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapte,:
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The qurstion presented in this case was summarily trrated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g- F. Supp. (ED La.
1975); W"i sbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those ca"c' does not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to consider more fully that queb'tion. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 670-671 (1974).
2 Jurisdiction
was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. 'The equal protection denial was alleged to constituate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim
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m1ssed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintr1n law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement pJrsonnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,.
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H] igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of tl:e job." !d., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,.
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. 'The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. ld., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), forit determined that the age classification established by·
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.
I

We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973),
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. 4 Mandatory retirement at age 50
E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate).
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v.
California, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry)...
3
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under the MassachuseHs statute involves neithep
situatiqn:
The requirement implicates no funqamental right of
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun ...
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ...
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
I d., at 33-34. The Cour~ecisions give no support
to the proposition that the Constitution guarantees a
right of governmental employment per se. See San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny
"has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities."
Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect ciass for purposes of equai
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." While the
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be
sai'd to discriminate only against the elderly, Rather, it

/C-t.
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draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judicial scrutiny."
II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness;
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec·t ion in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid. 5
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State: Through mandatory retirement at
(l

5 See, e. g., San Antonio SchooL District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley ·v..
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 78-79 (1911).
6 See San Antonio School District v Rodlriguez, supra, at ·n.
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age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 7
Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda·
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective. 8 There is no indication
7 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582,
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." /d., at 8. The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., at 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retirement ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann . c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975).
8 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
·Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) , also deny equ.al pro-
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that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
statute. 9
That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its purpose. 10 But where rationality is the test, a
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this
difference that renders the different employment requirements reasonable and hence constitutional.
u Review of Massachusetts' maximum ac(iimitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955).
1 " Indred , were it not for the existing annual individual examinar
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
.individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve tp

~
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statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retirement can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 11 But "[w]e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.
The judgment is reversed.

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera, tion or decision of this case.

eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
11
E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging : 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep .
No . 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972) ; Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87- 101 ,
121- 127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967).
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This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni..
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired . . . upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exerc1se within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides :
" (a) •.• Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting th.e convening of a three:judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge distwenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state
pollee in the department of pubhc safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occur~."
" (b) Any ... officer ... who has performed service ... for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or· inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is 'likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires · that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
,,
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La.
1975) ; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, '415 U. S. 986 (1974),
' dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose
th1s opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., U. S. (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 670-671 (1974) .
2
JurisdictiOn was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti:tuate a violation of 42 U. S. C.· § 1983 Appellee made no claim
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting o£
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed im
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state
mterest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can ber
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H] igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." l d., at 755.
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U S.IC. § 621 et Beq
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
'that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi'fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
"The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for
it determined that the age classification established by
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of offioers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter..
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.

I
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973),
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi...
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan..
tage of a suspect class.~ Mandatory retirement at age 50
E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
pnvate nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel}; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed b~· the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Willia1flsun, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate).
4
E . g. , Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlzn v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama ,v.
1Ca/ifornia, 332 U. S. 633 (19'47) (ancestry).
.
3
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
.
.
'.(~
situation,
This Court's deciswns give no support to the proposi-~
tioll that a right of governmental employment per se
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, supra, Lindsey v. Normet, 405
l' S. 56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less
tha11 strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to
state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at
485.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equ9-l
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such. disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposefpl unequttl
treatment, or relegated to such a position of politic~
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." While the
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,.
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the· basis of stereotyped.
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it.
·draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a udiscrete and insular" group, see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,.
' 1.52-153, n 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
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tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judicial scrutiny,"

II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
vahd. 5
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State: " Through mandatory retirement at
age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 7
r.

See, e. g., San Antonio School Dtstnct v. Rodriguez, supra, at

40-41 ; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911) .
See San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, supra, at 17.
A s p ec~al legislative commission's report preccdmg the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The
D1vision of State Poltce, by virtue of the work demanded of its
0

7
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda·
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for Uniformed .work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re~
lated to the State's objective.8 There is no indication
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to
demonstrate that men !1bove middle life are not usually physically
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582,
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." /d., at 8. The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., at 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to
respond to the demands of their JObs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No . 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retirement ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975) .
8 Appellee seems to have suggested m oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of

74-1044-PER CURIAM
MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA

9

that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
statute. 9
That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
IS not to say that the State's objective of assuring
physical fitne~s is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. This is only to say that with
regard to the interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its
purpose. 10 But where rationality is the test, a statute
"does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-

l

other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
•
·
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955).
.( ~
u Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) .
10
Indeed, were it not for the ex1stmg annual mdividual examinations through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., ·at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
tbe best fifty-year-old officers.
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ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate thq
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 11 But "[w]e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." /d., at 487. We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.
The judgment is reversed.

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging;
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep ..
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.1 pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101;.
i21-127, 212-2i7, 464-471 (1967) .
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This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uniformed State Police Officer 11 shall be retired ... upon his
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides:
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached hi~ twenty-first birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
l!Uch an officer .. .. "
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides:
"(a) . .. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Appellee brought this civil action
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two ... who has performrd srrvire in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the stnte board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in
the case of an officer appointrd under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the st.ate board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed DiYision
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayrd past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' :-ervice.
The question pre~entrd in thiR ra~e wa.~ summaril~· treated in
Ca·nnon v. Gu.ste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La.
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), nff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974); Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974),
dismissing nppenl from 454 Pn. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
curf'ory consideration in tho~e ca.Rcs docs not, of cour~'<e, foreclose
thiR opportunity to rollsider more fully ihat question. Sec, e. g.,
Bclelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,670-671 (1974).
2 .Jurisdiction was
invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 13~3.
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.'
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial wns alleged to constituate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of R etirement, 376 F.
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974) . We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects , and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed , "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few , if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755.
under th e federal Age Discrimina tion in Emplo~•m ent Act of 19(17 ,
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq .
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state offirers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired. and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still renderPd him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians:
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. /d., at 77- 78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
tf'st, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for
it determined that the age classification established by
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been
no ~bowing that reaching age 50 forecast even "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.
I

We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 16 ( 1973) ,
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class! Mandatory retirement at age 50
E . g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Cart er, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate t ravel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 ( 1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment ) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942 ) (right to procreate).
" E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (aliena ge ) ;
J.v! cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race ) ; Oyam a v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
3

J

..

·,

r

'
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
situation.
This Court's decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 73 ( 1972) ; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less
than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to
state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Ibid.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." While the
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
police officers over the age of 50.
It cannot be
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group,
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
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marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judicial scrutiny."
II

We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. W'aliarns, supra,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid."
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the
fltate's classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State: 6 Through mandatory retirement at
age 50. the legislature sPeks to protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed poJicc. 7
5

Sec, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at
40-41; Madden v. Kent1tclcy, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbon1:c Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
G See San Antm1io School Distrir·t v. Rodriguez, supm, at 17.
7
A s]wcial legislrttive commission's report precrding 1he cnnrtment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police strrted: "The
Division of Stfttc Policr, by Yirtuc of the nature of the work de-
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police serviee
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally relatrd to the State's objective ..q There is no indication
mandcd of its members, nndoubledly rcqnire::; rompnrn I ivcly young
mrn of vigorous physiqnr. The nalure of the duties to be Ilcrformed
in all weathers is arduous in thr cxi,rcme. . . . No argument i~
necdrd to demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually
ph?sically able to perform such duti<'s." Mnss. Leg. Dar., Honse
No. 1582, nt 8 (1938). With thrso considE'n1tions in mind, the Stntc's
Commissioner of Public Snfet~r nrgucd brfore the commis~ion for proYisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commis8ioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as n
matler of public policy." !d., at 8.' The commission, however,
deferred the problem of setting retirement nges for the State Policc
1o special study, their sole reason for not recommending agr 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the rrasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., nt 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed b~· thr
rommission, but was ultimately enactE'd by the legisla turc nfter
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Aets &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent thnt the pnrpose of the limit:1tion
was to protect the public by as~uring the ability of State Polirr to
respond to the demands of their jobR. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2.')00,
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the
State's maximum-nge scheme, which sets higher mandatory rrtirement ages for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. r. :~2,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975).
R Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument , however, is unper~uasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
per~onnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of
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that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the·
statute. 9
That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50>
is not to say that th e objective of assuring physical fitness is not rationally furth ered by a maximum age
limitation. It is only to say that with regard to the
interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not
chosen the best mean s to accomplish this purpose. 10
But where rationality is th e test , a State "does not viola.te
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retireother state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 ( 1955).
fl Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by st:cte legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No . 2500, at 7 (1955).
1 u Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual cxnminations through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
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ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 11 But " [ w] e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." Id., at 487. We decide only that the system
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.

The judgment is reversed.

JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR.

11 E. g., M . Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep .
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Scss., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101,
121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967) .
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NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publication
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re·
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United Stntes, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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This case presents the question whether the provision
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni..
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired .. . upon his
attaining age fifty,." denies appellee police officer equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides :
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may authorize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . .
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the commonwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process,
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not
reached his twenty-first birthday nor any person who has passed his
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualification shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as
such an officer...."
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides :
"(a)
Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter.1

0

0

•
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his
50th birthday. Appellee brought this civil action
in the United States District Court for the DisLrict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of
~ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge distwenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years,
whichever last occurs."
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service ... for not
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board,
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be
permanent."
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service.
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g F. Supp. (ED La.
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp.
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974),
dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See, e. g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,670-671 (1974).
2 .Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1343,
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to constituate a violation of 42. U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim.
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972) . On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court
judgment and remanded the case with direction to convene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on
the ground that ''a classification based on age 50 alone
lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute.
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F .
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S.
974 (1975). We reverse.
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uniformed officers participate in controlling prison and civil
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters,
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime,
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up support for local law enforcement personnel. As the District Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the partially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's]
experts concede that there is a general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755.
under the fedrral Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U. S. C. § 621 et Beq.
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These considerations prompt the requirement that
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties
of a uniformed officer.
The record includes the testimony of three physicians :
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the
physiological and psychological demands involved in the
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally
to the relationship between aging and the ability to perform under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testified to aging and the ability safely to perform police
functions. The testimony clearly established that the
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular
system, increases with age, and that the number of individuals in a given age group incapable of performing
stress functions increases with the age of the group.
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recognized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers.
'The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would
require a detailed number of studies. !d., at 77-78.
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the District Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for·
it determined that the age classification established by
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast even "imminent
change" in an officer's physical condition, the District Court held that compulsory retirement at age
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the
capabilities of officers individually by means of comprehensive annual physical examinations. We agree that
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection.
We disagree, however, with the District Court's determination that the age 50 classification is not rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.
I

We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for determining whether the mandatory retirement provision
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 16 ( 1973),
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. 4 Mandatory retirement at age 50
E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S: 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) .
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Ji'lorida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama Y •.
(Jalijornia, ~3A!: U. S. W3 (1948) (ancestry).
3
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither
situation.
This Court's decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School
District Y. Rodn:guez, supra.; Lindsey v. 1Yormet, 405 U.S.
56, 73 ( Hl72); Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. Accordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less
than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to
state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities." Ibid.
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." While the
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination , such persons, unlike,
say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state
It cannot be
police officers over the age of 50.
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group,
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec·
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it.
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marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict
judicial scrutiny.
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized
as "strict judicial scrutiny."
II
We turn then to examine this state classification under
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, supra,
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid."
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State: 6 Through mandatory retirement at
age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 7
5

See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at

40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911) .
6 See San Antonio School District v. Rodri(Juez, supra, at 17.
A special legislative commi~sion's rrport pr<:'c<:'ding the enactment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "Th~
Divi:sion of St{lte 'Police, by virtue- of the nature of the work de7

..
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda~
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally related to the State's objective. 8 There is no indication
mandrd of its members, undoubtedly require::; comparative]~· young
men of vigorous physique. The na,ture of the dutie~ to be performed
in all weathers is nrduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is
needed to demonstrate that men a,bove middle life arc not usually
physically able to perform such duties." Mas~. Lrg. Doc., House
No. 1582, at 8 (1938). With the::;e con~iderations in mind, the Statr's
Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commi~s1on for provisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police]
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however,
· deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9.
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts &
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500,
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retirement ages for l~s demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Law,; Ann. c. 32,
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975).
8 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive.
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that
the work of state tmiformed officers is more demanding than that of

74-1044-PER CURIAM
MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF

RETIR~MENT

v. MURGIA

·g

that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the
statute. 9
That the State chooses not to determine fitness
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50
is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fitness is not. rationally furthered by a maximum age
limitation. It is only to say that with regard to the
interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not
chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose. 10
But where rationality is the test. a State "does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S., at 485.
We do not make light of the substantial economic and
psychological effects premature and compulsory retireother state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification.
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 ( 1955).
9 Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state legislative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire."
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc.,
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955).
10 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual rxaminations through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of mandatory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduction of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments rationality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as
the best fifty-year-old officers.
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lllent can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the~
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to
society. The problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute. 11 But "[w]e
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse,
or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system.
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny
appellee equal protection of the law.
The judgment is

MR.

reversed~.

took no part in the considera-.
tion or decision of this case.
JusTICE STEVENS

n E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging,.
Developments in Aging: 1971 and Jarmary-March 1972, S. Re\).
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Ses$., pts. 1 & 2, 36.-46, 87-lOl,.
121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967).

